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Consider new home construction contracts. Few home-
builders, homebuyers, or architects would associate “drafting” 
with “writing a contract.” When contracting for the construc-
tion of a new home, the homebuyer does not ask the architect 
to spec out the details of the house plan in the text of a written 
contract. No architect would, and probably none could, effi-
ciently, accurately, and precisely explain in full text the height, 
width, thickness, and style of every door along with each door-
way’s specific gap from the door, hinge location and style, door-
stop depth, tolerance for all of the previous measurements, etc. 
Were the homebuyer to find an ambitious architect–lawyer to 
 
  *Associate, Vinson & Elkins, LLP; The University of Texas School of 
Law, J.D. 2013; Harvard College, A.B. 2009. The opinions expressed in this 
Article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 
author’s firm or its clients. I owe a debt to a banker, a securities regulator, 
and an industry litigation expert, each of whom provided a fundamental un-
derstanding of how these structured financial products are really made, regu-
lated, and fought over without which this paper could not have been written 
and all of whom asked to remain unnamed. Thank you also to Professor Bill 
Stutts at The University of Texas School of Law for his advice throughout the 
research and writing process, as well as to my dear wife, Veronika Bordás, for 
patiently tolerating monologues on collateralized debt obligations and 
bankruptcy. Any mistakes are the author’s own. 
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draft such a behemoth, in the absence of an equally adept con-
struction worker–lawyer, the construction crew likely could 
neither understand that contract nor translate it into a home. 
To “draft” a home in legalese would be a fool’s errand. Of 
course, no one “drafts” a home layout in the construction con-
tract. Instead, the contract refers to drafted blueprints, dia-
grams, models, and specification sheets as the determinative 
legal source for the home design, writing out only the sur-
rounding business operations and asset-quality guarantees for 
which transactional drafting is well-suited.1 
Now turn to structured financial products.2 Complex ar-
rangements ordering the distribution of cash flow from under-
lying assets to different classes (tranches) of bondholders and 
equity-holders characterize structured financial instruments 
 
1. See, e.g., 2 NANCY SAINT-PAUL, CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT 
FORMS § 18:3 (2d ed. 2013) (“Contractor agrees to furnish all services, materi-
als, labor, tools, equipment, and all other items required to undertake and 
complete all work required by the general conditions of the contract attached 
hereto, and the drawings, plans, and specifications prepared by [name of pre-
parer] for the construction of [description of project]. The following drawings, 
plans, and specifications identified by the signatures of the parties to this 
agreement form a part of this contract as if they were set out herein.”) (alter-
ations in original), available at Westlaw CDFMS. 
2. “There is no universal definition of structure[d] finance.” FRANK J. 
FABOZZI ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO STRUCTURED FINANCE 1 (2006). The Authors 
discuss several definitions of structured finance. Id. at 1-9. Identifying the 
use of a “special purpose vehicle,” a “bond issue that is asset-backed,” “a com-
bination of interest-rate and credit derivatives,” among other traits, as char-
acteristic of structured financial products. Id. at 2. Providing a slightly differ-
ent set of criteria, the Committee on the Global Financial System from the 
Bank for International Settlements identified the following three characteris-
tics: 
 
(1) pooling of assets (either cash-based or synthetically cre-
ated); (2) tranching of liabilities that are backed by the asset 
pool (this property differentiates structured finance from 
traditional “pass-through” securitisations); (3) de-linking of 
the credit risk of the collateral asset pool from the credit 
risk of the originator, usually through use of a finite-lived, 
standalone special purpose vehicle (SPV). 
 
COMM. ON THE GLOBAL FIN. SYS., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, THE ROLE OF 
RATINGS IN STRUCTURED FINANCE: ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS 1 (2005), [herein-
after ROLE OF RATINGS], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs23.pdf. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/8
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like collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”) and other similar-
ly tranched products.3 These cash flow distribution arrange-
ments, called waterfalls,4 are highly complex and include nu-
merous interdependencies between distributions to different 
classes of investors.5 Like a house plan, structured financial 
product waterfalls are “too complex to depict”6 accurately or 
perceive accurately or precisely from a written contract. In 
spite of the limitations of the written word to express these 
agreements, dealmakers in structured finance contracts persist 
in their attempts to depict “‘complete contract[s]’ that fully 
specif[y] the rights of all the transaction’s participants and the 
rules for determining payments to note holders under alterna-
tive scenarios of asset pool performance.”7 Like the hypothet-
ical Sisyphean architect–lawyer struggling and inevitably fail-
ing to depict completely in word-pictures each joist and beam in 
a home, structured finance dealmakers can waste a great deal 
of time and resources developing imperfect deal documents 
that cannot accurately depict the desired or functional (actual) 
reality of the distribution waterfall. 
In order to free dealmakers from this Sisyphean task, this 
Article proposes that complex structured finance transactions 
involving sophisticated investors should adopt an analogous so-
lution to the home construction agreements’ strategy of con-
tracting by reference to blueprints. First, dealmakers should, 
preferably by choice, place as much of their waterfall distribu-
tion specification and related inputs as possible into automat-
ed, programmatic representations that will be used to make the 
actual distribution. In many cases, these agreements already 
 
3. ROLE OF RATINGS, supra note 2, at 9-11. Collateralized loan obliga-
tions, collateralized mortgage obligations, and certain credit card asset-
backed securities also have multiple classes or tranches of bondholders and 
equity-holders. Id. at 4-5. 
4. See Henry T. C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, “Pure Infor-
mation,” and the SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1632-33 
(2012) (citing Asset-Backed Securities, Securities Act Release No. 33-8518, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-50905, 70 Fed. Reg. 1506, 1511 (Jan. 7, 2005) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228, 229, 230, 232, 239, 240, 242, 245, & 249)). 
5. See ROLE OF RATINGS, supra note 2, at 11. 
6. See generally Hu, supra note 4 at 1633-42 (discussing failure in depic-
tion of complex products such as asset-backed securities). 
7. ROLE OF RATINGS, supra note 2, at 11. 
3
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have programmatic representations,8 so this change should 
pose relatively few practical challenges logistically. Second, 
they should, like their counterparts in construction contracts, 
define the terms of those waterfalls by reference to their func-
tional representations. The contract should be depicted by the 
same code that will decide the actual distribution, and that 
coded depiction should be the legally binding contract. By uni-
fying the functional and legal realities of the structured finance 
products, dealmakers will avoid wasting resources on creating 
unnecessary and inaccurate legal depictions, and will also re-
duce the legal and financial risk created by the imprecision and 
inaccuracy of perception those poor depictions create. 
This Article will proceed as follows: In Part II, this Article 
sets out to restate and expand Professor Henry Hu’s explana-
tion of the intermediary depiction problem with what this Arti-
cle terms the challenge of perception.9 Professor Hu observes 
that the difficulty with the current regulatory disclosure re-
gime is one of imperfect depictions and could be fixed with pure 
information disclosure. By contrast, this Article contends that 
so long as there are multiple potentially legally determinative 
depictions, there will be financial, legal, and systemic risk. Be-
cause of that, no regime of additional disclosures can, by itself, 
reduce those risks; if anything, adding to the number of poten-
tially legally binding disclosures increases risk. Therefore, in 
Part III, this Article proposes that in complex structured fi-
nance agreements’ waterfalls and other similar agreements be-
tween sophisticated parties, the functional code that creates 
the functional reality should, as described above, become the 
contract by reference in the legal deal document and thus 
should become the legally determinative reality. This would 
reduce the confusion that impedes perception of the future real-
ity of the financial product’s cash flow distributions. 
 
8. See DARREN SMITH & PAMELA WINCHIE, CASH CDO MODELLING WITH 
EXCEL: A STEP BY STEP APPROACH 1-2 (2010) (discussing the transition from 
primarily using Excel-based modeling of CDOs to the use of proprietary soft-
ware solutions); Attachments to Memorandum from Rolaine S. Bancroft, At-
torney-Advisor, Office of Rulemaking, Div. of Corp. Fin., Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, to Commission File No. S7-08-10 (Oct. 19, 2010) (on file with SEC), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-10/s70810-170.pdf. 
9. Hu, supra note 4, at 1642–43. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/8
  
2014] TOO COMPLEX TO PERCEIVE? 353 
 
II. Too Many Depictions Means Too Many Potential  
Realities to Perceive 
 
A contract to build a home and its blueprint exhibits mere-
ly permit prediction of how the finished house will be built and 
how it will look.10 Until the home is finished, there are many 
potential homes that could exist given how the builders inter-
pret the contract and the blueprints. The number of potential 
future homes that might exist expands further when many 
sources generate multiple design documents as well as sepa-
rate specifications and specific contract terms, all of which 
might misalign, causing “document coordination errors.”11 The 
number grows higher still when the possibility of a dispute 
arises, because once a court or arbitrator steps in to resolve 
that conflict, all bets are off as to how the contract and exhibits 
will be interpreted.12 And even after the dispute is resolved, the 
original problem of builder implementation of that clarified 
contract’s requirements remains. 
Structured financial products create a similar, but more 
difficult challenge of depiction and perception. Currently, there 
are two legally relevant depictions: (1) legal-English contracts 
and indentures,13 and (2) “plain”-English prospectuses, offering 
 
10. There is a debate in the courts and academia about whether and to 
what exactitude builders should be held accountable to blueprints incorpo-
rated into contracts. For an example of this discussion in the context of the 
“economic waste” standard in the case of construction defects, see Richard D. 
Schepp, Comment, A Call for Recognition of Owners’ Subjective Valuations in 
Residential Construction Defect Cases, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 1139, 1146-49 
(1989). 
11. 2 PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER AND 
O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 7:132 (2002 & Supps. 2003–2013), availa-
ble at Westlaw BOCL. 
12. Id. § 7:132 & n.9. 
13. Some dispute the characterization of bond indentures that specify 
the operation of the trustee—the distributor of the cash flows from underly-
ing assets according to the waterfall, in our case—as a contract. Martin Rig-
er, The Trust Indenture as Bargained Contract: The Persistence of Myth, 16 J. 
CORP. L. 211, 211-15 (1991). Professor Martin Riger argues that indenture for 
public bonds are not contracts because the bondholders did not bargain for 
the terms of the indenture. Id. While there is some validity to this point, in 
the context of these highly complex structured financial instruments sold 
primarily to sophisticated buyers, this argument is likely not relevant. 
5
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memoranda, and other similar customer-facing disclosures.14 
And if the SEC’s proposed amendment to disclosure rules con-
cerning asset-backed securities, Regulation AB, ever reaches 
final rule status, it will constitute a third legally relevant doc-
ument.15 There are also non-legal formal mathematical depic-
tions and the functional depictions. None of these depictions re-
flect accurately the desired reality of the parties, assuming 
there is a single such reality.16 Furthermore, in the act of 
 
14. In as much as a misrepresentation in a prospectus about the under-
lying arrangement can create civil liability, the prospectus can provide an al-
ternate legal reality to the contract for registered securities. For a discussion 
of liability for misstatements in registration statements, which include pro-
spectuses, see Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012) (creating 
civil liability for false registration statements); 12 C.F.R. § 16.2(m) (2013) 
(“Registration statement means a filing that includes the prospectus and oth-
er information required by section 7 of the Securities Act.”) (citation omitted). 
For discussion of liability arising from misstatements in prospectuses made 
to the person purchasing the security, see Securities Act of 1933 § 12(2), 15 
U.S.C. § 77l (2012). SEC Rule 10b-5 also forbids deceptive conduct with secu-
rities in an exchange or over-the-counter and in private transactions, includ-
ing misstatements in prospectuses and other communications. 17 C.F.R. § 
240.10b-5 (2013). For a useful table of the different laws and relevant liabili-
ties, see JOHN J. CLARKE, JR. & LISA FIRENZE, HOW TO PREPARE AN INITIAL 
PUBLIC OFFERING: DUE DILIGENCE AND POTENTIAL LIABILITIES app. at 40 (Dec. 
2010), available at 
http://www.dlapiper.com/files/upload/PLI_Materials_2011.pdf. The SEC has 
also proposed in Regulation AB II to impose increased disclosure require-
ments on privately traded, unregistered securities by conditioning 144A safe 
harbors upon disclosure equivalent to that required in Regulation AB. Asset-
Backed Securities, Securities Act Release No. 33-9117, Exchange Act Release 
No. 34-61858, 75 Fed. Reg. 23,328, 23,332-33 (proposed May. 3, 2010) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 229, 230, 232, 239, 240, 243, & 249). This would 
effectively require a prospectus for those unregistered products. The Ameri-
can Bar Association believes that even after the Dodd–Frank Act, the SEC 
does not have the power to require privately issued securities falling under 
Securities Act of 1933 § 4(1) and § 4(2) to provide these sorts of disclosures. 
Letter from Jeffrey W. Rubin, Chair, Comm. of Fed. Regulation of Sec., Am. 
Bar Ass’n Bus. Law Section & Vicki O. Tucker, Chair, Comm. on Securitiza-
tion & Structured Fin., Am. Bar Ass’n Bus. Law Section, to Elizabeth M. 
Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n at 83-86 (Aug. 17, 2010) (on file with 
SEC) [hereinafter Letter from Jeffrey W. Rubin], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-10/s70810-150.pdf. 
15. Asset-Backed Securities, 75 Fed. Reg. at 23,379-80. 
16. Assuming bonds are contracts, see supra note 13 and accompanying 
text, there remain concerns about whether bond purchasers reach a meeting 
of the minds with the issuers and underwriters, though Professor David 
Groshoff argues that they do. David Groshoff, Would “Junkholder Primacy” 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/8
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translating between depictions—particularly by translating the 
legal depiction to the functional depiction that will create the 
functional reality—the ability to perceive precisely and accu-
rately the legal reality is difficult or impossible because there 
are so many potentially conflicting legal depictions competing 
to be the legal reality. The combination of inherent and signifi-
cant complexity within these structured financial agreements 
and the confusion of different potential legally determinative 
documents creates business and legal risk. 
This Part explains the challenges of depiction and percep-
tion, how they increase financial and legal risks and costs for 
the parties to structured finance deals, and why the status quo 
as well as current proposals to remedy these difficulties will 
not solve these problems. Part A introduces briefly the relevant 
contractual arrangements.17 Part B demonstrates that the 
presence of multiple legally relevant depictions makes accurate 
and precise perception of the future legal reality, and thus the 
future functional business reality, difficult and perhaps impos-
sible.18 
 
A.   An Explanation of Waterfall Distributions in the Context of 
CDOs 
 
Stepping back, a brief introduction to our waterfall exem-
plar, CDOs, is in order to provide the context for what this Ar-
ticle proposes later, and, alas, there is no suitable construction 
analogy even though CDOs often sit atop residential mortgage 
securities. This subpart will provide relevant background on 
the structure and implementation of waterfalls in the context 
of the CDOs. It will then explain contexts outside of CDOs 
where waterfalls appear. 
A basic understanding of an arrangement like a CDO is 
necessary to follow the remainder of this Article’s discussion of 
waterfalls and their execution. Starting at the most basic level, 
 
Reduce Junk Corporate Governance?, 13 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 59, 82-83 (2012). 
17. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
18. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
7
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bonds are a type of loan.19 Bonds are also securities, with all of 
the significance that label carries for regulation.20 Companies 
sell bonds to get cash.21 These bonds receive credit ratings and 
pay out at different interest (coupon) rates depending upon 
risk, with one typical CDO bond structure paying out interest 
throughout the maturation of the bond and repaying principal 
at maturity.22 If certain requirements are met, the Trust In-
denture Act of 1939 requires the assignment of a trustee to en-
sure the repayment of the loans for publicly offered bonds.23 In 
any case, the agreement that the trustee enforces is called an 
indenture.24 
As a legal business structure, CDOs typically sit on top of 
this trust indenture framework25 and add layers of legal and 
financial complexity. In CDOs, a special purpose vehicle 
(“SPV”), sells bonds and sometimes equity shares in order to fi-
nance the purchase of assets originated elsewhere.26 These as-
sets may include: secured home mortgages, credit card loans, 
student loans, commercial loans, asset-backed securities of 
these various types of debt, and sometimes other CDOs (called 
 
19. FRANK M. WERNER & JAMES A.F. STONER, MODERN FINANCIAL 
MANAGING: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 347 (3d ed. 2007). 
20. Securities Act of 1933 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012). 
21. See TIMOTHY J. GALLAGHER & JOSEPH D. ANDREW, FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 26-28 (4th ed. 2007). 
22. See id. 
23. Trust Indenture Act of 1939 §§ 310(a), 304(a)(9), 15 U.S.C. §§ 
77jjj(a), 77ddd(a)(9) (2012). 
24. WERNER & STONER, supra note 19, at 347. Depending upon the struc-
ture of the CDO and the role of the trustee, sometimes the language of pool-
ing and servicing agreement is used in lieu of indenture. See CORPORATE 
TRUST COMM., AM. BANKERS ASS’N, THE TRUSTEE’S ROLE IN ASSET-BACKED 
SECURITIES 5 (2010) (“A pooling and servicing agreement, trust indenture or 
similar agreement forms the basic document which sets forth the relationship 
among the parties and the assets.”), available at 
http://www.aba.com/aba/documents/press/RoleoftheTrusteeinAsset-
BackedSecuritiesJuly2010.pdf. For the sake of simplicity, this paper will refer 
to indentures and trustees. 
25. Douglas J. Lucas et al., Collateralized Debt Obligations, in 1 
HANDBOOK OF FINANCE: FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTRUMENTS 395, 399 
(Frank J. Fabozzi ed., 2008) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF FINANCE]. The follow-
ing describes only one of many types of financial and business structures for a 
CDO for purpose of providing an example. 
26. Id. at 396. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/8
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CDO-squared (“CDO2”)), or, if taken a step higher, CDO-cubed 
((“CDO3”), etc.).27 An investment bank arranges the structure of 
the relevant organizations and products by serving as a struc-
turer.28 This is where things become hairier. The structuring 
sponsor typically places assets of different risk classes into the 
SPV.29 Cash flow from payments on these loans comes into the 
SPV, which then pays the trustee to monitor (and in some 
senses, to manage) the distribution of that cash flow to the 
bondholders as interest and principal payments and, if any 
cash remains, to the equity holders.30 The trustee or its subcon-
tractor ensures that the distribution aligns with the inden-
ture.31 
Adding to the complexity of the indenture that specifies 
cash distributions to bondholders, there are typically many 
classes or tranches of bondholders and the interest and princi-
pal cash flows pay each bond class successively.32 The cash 
pours down the waterfall of tranches, and if there is not enough 
to fulfill each tranche’s distribution requirement, then the low-
er tranches and the equity holders receive nothing.33 There are 
often (but not always) different waterfalls for interest and prin-
cipal as well as unique waterfalls in the case of a default.34 
Within the waterfall, shortfalls in the ability to pay interest or 
changes in the overcollateralization of underlying assets rela-
tive to stated bond principal amount can also change the order-
 
27. FRANCESCA CAMPOLONGO ET AL., QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF 
SECURITISATION DEALS 4 (2012); Lucas et al., Collateralized Debt Obligations, 
in HANDBOOK OF FINANCE, supra note 25, at 396. For useful diagrams of more 
complex types of securitization structures, see ANN RUTLEDGE & SYLVAIN 
RAYNES, ELEMENTS OF STRUCTURED FINANCE 135-38 (2010). 
28. Lucas et al., Collateralized Debt Obligations, in HANDBOOK OF 
FINANCE, supra note 25, at 398. 
29. See, e.g., id. at 399 (discussing the process of structuring CDOs). 
30. John D. Finnerty, Securities Innovation, in HANDBOOK OF FINANCE, 
supra note 25, at 71-72. 
31. Frank J. Fabozzi, Bonds: Investment Features and Risks, in 
HANDBOOK OF FINANCE, supra note 25, at 208. 
32. Lucas et al., Collateralized Debt Obligations, in HANDBOOK OF 
FINANCE, supra note 25, at 399-400. 
33. See id. 
34. JAN JOB DE VRIES ROBBÉ, SECURITIZATION LAW AND PRACTICE: IN THE 
FACE OF THE CREDIT CRUNCH 48-50 (2008). 
9
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ing of cash flows.35 External to the waterfall itself, the criteria 
for how the waterfall reacts to changes in assets’ credit ratings 
or the meaning of default are often defined idiosyncratically in 
each indenture agreement.36 
The indenture that specifies the cash flow and other terms 
of the security acts as a written legal contract,37 but knowing 
what a legal document is supposed to do is different from know-
ing how that transaction was made and then how the trustee 
implements it as a practical matter.38 First, a banker, often a 
financial engineer or other quant, develops a mathematical or 
algorithmic model of the structure of the assets and the inden-
ture.39 Then the deal is arranged by teams of lawyers for the 
sponsor, underwriter, trustee, documentation managers, and in 
some cases the investors.40 With varying degrees of interaction 
with the original financial engineer, the lawyers draft a written 
contractual representation as the indenture.41 The attorneys 
also craft a prospectus or other similarly definitive and effec-
tively binding disclosures (prospectuses or offer memoran-
da/circulars), which they can do before, during, or after the 
 
35. Lucas et al., Collateralized Debt Obligations, in HANDBOOK OF 
FINANCE, supra note 25, at 400-01. 
36. JANET M. TAVAKOLI, COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS AND 
STRUCTURED FINANCE: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN CASH AND SYNTHETIC 
SECURITIZATION 106-08 (1st ed. 2003). 
37. The relationship of the trustee, obligor entity (in this case the SPV), 
and the investor is more complicated than a traditional contract. For more 
discussion of the subtleties of the role of trust indenture as, among other ca-
pacities, trust and contract, see ROBERT I. LANDAU & JOHN E. KRUEGER, 
CORPORATE TRUST ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT 22-30 (5th ed. 1998); see 
also supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing critics of the idea of in-
denture as contract). 
38. Russell A. Hakes, Focusing on the Realities of the Contracting Pro-
cess—An Essential Step to Achieve Justice in Contract Enforcement, 12 DEL. 
L. REV. 95, 101-09 (2011). 
39. GEOFF CHAPLIN, CREDIT DERIVATIVES: TRADING, INVESTING, AND RISK 
MANAGEMENT 319-20 (2d ed. 2010). 
40. See Cesar Estrada & Jonathan Karen, On Waterfalls, PRIVATE 
EQUITY INT’L, June 2012, at 13 (discussing waterfall formation in the less 




41. See id. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/8
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drafting of the indenture.42 The business team provides models 
designed in proprietary software like CDO Edge and Intex’s so-
lutions that link programmed models of the waterfall to past 
asset data, which investors and others then use to simulate 
and stress test the product.43 The deal is then closed, and bonds 
and shares are sold. 
At this point, the trustee or other paying agent creates or 
modifies a preexisting Excel spreadsheet or some other cash 
flow model made in other proprietary software, such as 
Moody’s CDOnet Trustee.44 Periodically the trustee enters data 
about cash flow from assets and other data, such as interest 
rates into the model. Often, there is a great deal of human in-
tervention involved in the process of calculating the cash 
flows.45 The collateral manager and the trustee also deal with 
questions of how to characterize when a missed payment (or 
some other covenant violation such as falling out of the asset 
pool quality requirements) constitutes a default.46 Also, some 
CDOs are actively managed, meaning that the underlying as-
sets are actively traded in and out of the asset pool to change 
the configuration of the underlying pool, per limitations in the 
indenture’s covenants.47 Through this combination of pro-
 
42. JEFFREY C. HOOKE, SECURITY ANALYSIS AND BUSINESS VALUATION ON 
WALL STREET: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO TODAY’S VALUATION METHODS 41-
42 (2d ed. 2010). 
43. Letter from Kevin F. McCarthy, Managing Dir., Intex Solutions Inc., 
to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (July 30, 2010) (on file 
with SEC) [hereinafter Letter from Kevin F. McCarthy], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-10/s70810-57.pdf. 




45. This assertion is based on a conversation with an individual who de-
signed CDO models for a major investment bank and who asked to remain 
anonymous. 
46. See, e.g., Robert J. Coughlin, Caught in the Cross-Fire: Securitization 
Trustees and Litigation During the Subprime Crisis 11-12, NIXON PEABODY 
LLP (Sept. 18, 2009), 
http://www.nixonpeabody.com/files/securitization_litigation_subprime_crisis.
pdf (discussing a case in which a bondholder disputed the determination of 
the majority of the class of senior tranche notes that a default event had oc-
curred). 
47. John D. Finnerty, Securities Innovation, in HANDBOOK OF FINANCE, 
11
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grammatic depictions, human intervention, and sometimes 
surprisingly extensive amounts of discretion, cash distributions 
are determined and executed. 
As a final point of background, it is important to note that 
similarly styled waterfalls are used in other securitized prod-
ucts like collateralized loan obligations, collateralized mortgage 
obligations, and credit card debt backed master trusts. Master 
limited partnerships (MLPs) also can use waterfalls. MLPs are 
a creature of the tax-system used by pipeline entities and other 
entities with relatively stable cash flow (though less stable cash 
flows have become more common).48 MLPs issue market-
tradable limited partnership interests and have a similarly, if 
not equally, complex structure of prioritized payments to inter-
est-holders.49 The arguments and proposals made throughout 
the rest of this Article are equally applicable to MLP waterfall 
structures. 
Structurally complex waterfalls also characterize private 
equity funds’, hedge funds’, and venture capital funds’ cash dis-
tributions between general and limited partners.50 In private 
equity funds, “[d]epending on a fund’s performance, the [gen-
eral partner] (GP) may receive more than its pro rata share of 
proceeds based solely on its invested capital; these additional 
amounts potentially payable to the GP are referred to as ‘car-
ried interest.’”51 Two members of the field expressly identify in 
the fund context the insufficiency of drafting to translate a 
 
supra note 25, at 72. 
48. David N. Fleischer et al., Master Limited Partnerships, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTING 81, 86-87, 89 (Michael Underhill 
ed., 2010) [hereinafter THE HANDBOOK OF INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTING]; Appli-
cation of the Two-Class Method Under FASB Statement No. 128, Earnings 
Per Share, to Master Limited Partnerships, FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS. BD. 
EMERGING ISSUES TASK FORCE 2 (May 23, 2007), 
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175818822993&b
lobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs. 
49. David N. Fleischer et al., Master Limited Partnerships, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTING, supra note 48, at 87. 
50. See generally Estrada & Karen, supra note 40, at 13 (explaining the 
difficulties in designing waterfalls and translating between the legal, busi-
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model into language and language into implementation.52 And, 
like the waterfalls in structured finance products, waterfalls in 
private equity firms have multiple variations (e.g., American 
versus European), contingencies (clawbacks, catch-ups), and 
linguistic vagaries (e.g., how often should interest compound).53 
These agreements suffer from the same complexity and draft-
ing challenges as a CDO and thus this proposal could be appli-
cable to them. 
 
B.    Mutually Inaccurate Depictions Interfere with Precise  
Perceptions of the Future Functional Reality of Cash      
Distribution, Creating Business, Legal, and Systemic Risks 
 
CDO waterfalls are, as Professor Hu examines in his arti-
cle “Too Complex to Depict?” and as members of the industry 
recognize, fairly complex systems, and the “slippages” between 
different depictions—models, prospectus, contract, and func-
tional (“effective”) reality—can sometimes be substantial.54 
This subpart will first explain how the various depictions are 
inaccurate relative to one another and imprecise if examined as 
collections of depictions, following a similar line of argument as 
raised by Professor Hu. Then, moving beyond Professor Hu’s 
discussion of depiction, this subpart will show how these mul-
tiple depictions impede precise and accurate perception of the 
desired and future legal and functional realities. Finally, this 
subpart will finally explain how the inability to perceive pre-
cisely and accurately the future legal reality creates risk in the 
creation of the functional implementation reality that will ac-
tually dictate cash flows. 
As a preliminary matter, it will be helpful to define depic-
tion, perception, and reality. Depictions refer to mathematical 
models and business plans, prospectuses and offer memoranda 
or circulars, contracts and indentures, and programmed mod-
els. Furthermore, to depict is to create these depictions.55 Per-
 
52. See id. 
53. See id. at 14-16. 
54. Hu, supra note 4, at 1636-42. 
55. This following discussion of depictions agrees with and owes a great 
deal to Professor Hu’s conception of intermediary depictions discussed in Hu’s 
13
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ception is the understanding derived from reading, observing, 
probing, or analyzing the relevant depiction in order to decide 
how the reality of the world—in this case the distribution of 
cash flows for a CDO—should be ordered. Reality is the result 
of the perception that represents a sort of determinative truth 
that predicts or defines what happens in the real world—i.e., 
the desired reality and the predictive reality create the real 
world or the future real world. Sometimes we try to perceive 
depictions for purposes of building the world, and other times 
we try to perceive in a determinative or predictive fashion what 
reality will be in the future to evaluate risk by looking to depic-
tions of that reality. 
Some additional terms are relevant to understanding the 
relationship between various depictions, perception, and reali-
ty. At a high level, these are the concepts of accuracy and pre-
cision.56 Accuracy refers to the proximity of the point or depic-
tion of interest to some objective reference point.57 So, on a dart 
board, if all of the darts circle closely the inner ring of the 
bull’s-eye, but do not land inside of it, they are relatively accu-
rate because they landed close to the objective reference point: 
the bull’s-eye.58 Precision, on the other hand, is a reflection of 
how closely together the various points or depictions of interest 
are to one another.59 Thus, if all of the darts land in the top-
most point of the dart board (hence, they landed inaccurately), 







“Too Complex to Depict?,” supra note 4, though it does not perfectly align 
with his description in the details. The concepts of perception and realities 
are, however, distinct from his discussion. 
56. SOC’Y OF MFG. ENG’RS, TOOL AND MANUFACTURING ENGINEERS 
HANDBOOK 12-1 to -2 (Desk ed. 1989). 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 12-2 fig.12-1. 
59. Id. at 12-1 to -2. 
60. Id. at 12-2 fig.12-1. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/8
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1. The Challenge of Accurate, and Thus of Precise,  
    Depiction 
 
Depiction of a complex idea in different media—each with 
its own constraints—inevitably results in errors in translation. 
In the construction context, the differences between artistic 
representation for the homebuyer, 3-D AutoCAD and physical 
models for the architect, 2-D construction blueprints for the 
builder, and the completed built home each reflect the limita-
tions of their separate media.61 At least with these media and 
methods of depiction, however, the process of translation be-
tween them is professionally standardized and there are gen-
erally no disputes about their order of relative priority in the 
case of a conflict. Those depicting structured financial products 
have no such luck and far less standardization in the methods 
of depiction.62 Unlike in the case of construction contracts, it 
might be impossible for many types of depictions to convey suf-
ficiently accurate and precise information to perceive the pre-
sent or future reality of how a trustee will distribute cash. In 
structured finance, there are several potential depictions, but 
we will focus on a few of the most relevant: the financial engi-
neer’s model depiction, the contractual/indenture depiction, the 
prospectus depiction, the predictive model depiction, and the 








61. For an example of an analogous discussion of depiction and percep-
tion in the context of construction, see MICHAEL JOYCE, RESIDENTIAL 
CONSTRUCTION ACADEMY: PLUMBING 229-30 (1st ed. 2004). 
62. See Estrada & Karen, supra note 40, at 13 (“[Fund] waterfall provi-
sions are often highly negotiated and bespoke arrangements, where nuances 
in words and implementation often produce significant differences in the cal-
culation and/or timing of distributions.”). 
63. See Hu, supra note 4, at 1636-42 (referring generally to the same 
categories of depictions though with a slightly different nomenclature). 
15
  




Figure 1. The Conventional Model of Depictions 
and Potential Future Realities 
 
Typically, the structurer, perhaps in negotiation with 
an anchor investor, attempts to accurately depict the 
desired reality of the waterfall as indenture terms and 
prospectus or other similar “plain English” depiction. 
These two documents compete for control of the legal 
reality. These documents also guide the production of 
a computerized model used to predict the cash distri-
bution of the bonds given various assumptions, and is 
the predictive reality. After the bonds are issued, the 
servicer, trustee, or other party implements a mixed 
manual and automated model to actually manage 
cash flows and convert them into distributions, and, 
barring a dispute, these are the functional reality. 
 
First, there are the financial engineer’s model depictions, 
which are typically expressed as a combination of theoretical 
mathematical models and technical specifications.64 The struc-
turer works with its quant to prepare business plan documents 
that relatively precisely specify the initial model.65 They repre-
sent a simplified, mathematically idealized version of world—
often perception of these depictions constitutes the closest to 
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the desired reality of the quant that will ever exist. Mathemat-
ical and technical depictions made by the structurer for pur-
poses of creating the waterfall and the rest of the CDO or other 
structured financial product typically are the first depiction 
made outside of the mind where the idea originated. 
Then the lawyers come to create the two legal depictions: 
the prospectus and the underlying contract—in the case of 
CDOs, the indenture. The indenture is legally binding and the 
parties negotiate as if it constitutes the legal reality of the cash 
flow.66 That said, sometimes the prospectus, if misaligned with 
the indenture, can create legal liability.67 In that case, the pro-
 
66. More precisely, there is typically an anchor investor with which the 
structurers negotiate about the terms of the agreement. Cf. BABSON CAPITAL, 
WHAT ARE CLOS AND HOW DO THEY WORK? 5 (2009), available at 
http://www.babsoncapital.com/BabsonCapital/http/bcstaticfiles/Research/file/
CLO%20White%20Paper_CLOWP4309_Jun09.pdf (referring to negotiations 
with anchor equity share investors); Lauren Macksoud, Junior Noteholder 
Gets “ZING’d” as Bankruptcy Court Allows Involuntary Filing of CDO Issuer 
by Senior Noteholder, BROKEN BENCH BYTES, KRAMER LEVIN NAFTALIS & 
FRANKEL LLP (Oct. 31, 2011), 
http://www.brokenbenchbytes.com/blog.aspx?entry=89 (discussing how the 
junior noteholders might lose the benefit of negotiated terms in a bankruptcy 
proceeding). 
67. See Howard Darmstadter, Legal- ease: The Dark Underside of the 
Prospectus, BUS. LAW TODAY, July/August 2000, at 30, 30 (“The prospectus 
gives investors rights that the indenture can’t undo. . . . It’s tempting — and 
most lawyers yield to the temptation — to imagine that the indenture is the 
sole source of the bondholders’ rights, and that the prospectus description of 
the bonds is just a gloss on the indenture. . . . In a sense, the indenture is the 
bond issue. But that doesn’t mean that it’s the only, or even the best, descrip-
tion of the bonds.”), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/blt7-
legal.html. Regulation AB requires the prospectus to include detailed descrip-
tions of all aspects of the cash distribution arrangement in ABSs. 17 C.F.R. § 
229.1113(b) (2013). Prospectuses have a plain English requirement. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.421(b), § 230.421(b) note (2013). Misstatements and failure to comply 
with prospectus requirements can lead to SEC and private actions. See Secu-
rities Act of 1933 § 11(a)(1)-(5), 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012) (creating liability for 
misstatements and omissions made in registration statements for public of-
ferings); Securities Act of 1933 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2006) (providing 
liability for public offerings made in violation of the registration require-
ments); 2 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION § 7.0-.11 (6th ed. 2009) (outlining the various liability regimes 
for public offerings of securities). Regulation AB does not apply to private 
placements in the secondary market, though the SEC’s proposed “Regulation 
AB II” rules could bring a similar disclosure regime to the unregistered mar-
ket as a condition for registration safe harbors. See Re-Proposal of Shelf Eli-
17
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spectus becomes the effective legal reality. 
Starting with the depiction as a legal contract or inden-
ture, with varying degrees of direct collaboration with the de-
signers of the CDO, attorneys begin drafting the prospectus 
and the indenture agreement in varying order depending upon 
their drafting preference.68 Some in the banking industry have 
warned that in the context of private equity waterfalls—which 
are typically less complex than CDO waterfalls—that best 
practices should require more direct involvement of the finance 
team with the legal team to ensure that the deal documents are 
correctly designed.69 As a J.P. Morgan manager and Simpson 
Thacher partner explain, for example, in the context of private 
equity, the business side should not depend on legal staff to 
correctly depict the desired reality using the financial model 
depictions as a basis,70 a concern that grows even larger when 
dealing with CDOs, and bespoke CDOs,71 and other arrange-
ments that introduce a great deal of potential discretion and 
ambiguity into arrangements. 
 
Seasoned finance and accounting professionals—
including those at experienced private fund ad-
ministrators—know firsthand that no matter how 
precise the drafting, prose often fails to translate 
perfectly to mathematical implementation in a 
manner that is completely free of ambiguity—or 
 
gibility Conditions for Asset-Backed Securities, Securities Act Release No. 33-
9244, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64968, 76 Fed. Reg. 47,948, 47970-71 (re-
proposed Aug. 5, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 230, 239 & 249) 
(requesting further comment on the proposal). See also supra note 14 and ac-
companying text (discussing prospectus liability and the SEC’s efforts to ex-
pand disclosure requirements to unregistered securitized products). 
68. See HOOKE, supra note 42, at 42. 
69. See Estrada & Karen, supra note 40, at 13-14. 
70. See id. (discussing waterfalls in the context of private hedge fund 
waterfall distributions). 
71. A bespoke CDO is “a CDO tranche designed to meet the needs of a 
particular client with the investment bank taking on the responsibility of 
hedging or laying off the risk relating to the rest of the CDO.” How Big Is the 
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that does not require the making of some unwrit-
ten assumptions.72 
 
As Professor Hu explained, quoting Robert J. Coughlin and 
Ripley E. Hastings, those drafting indentures have found that 
the complexity “has ‘seemingly outpaced discipline in draft-
ing.’”73 Combined with the difficulties of time constraints in 
drafting, these limitations of expression mean that the contract 
depictions do not express the same desired reality as the math-
ematical model depiction. Furthermore, as Professor Hu ob-
served, similar to other contracts, lawyers introduce ambiguity 
into contracts to add flexibility and the ability to cope with the 





Figure 2. The Predictive Disclosure Model 
 
The SEC’s model disclosure proposal effectively 
makes the predictive depiction and thus the predictive 
reality an additional competing depiction for control of 
the legal reality. 
 
72. See Estrada & Karen, supra note 40, at 13. 
73. Hu, supra note 4, at 1637 & n.178 (quoting Robert J. Coughlin & 
Ripley E. Hastings, Survival Skills Amid the Rubble: Life as a Trustee in a 
Market Collapse, 16 J. STRUCTURED FIN. 37, 42 (2010)). 
74. Id. at 1637. 
19
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 Lawyers face as difficult a challenge drafting the plain 
English prospectus—itself another potential legal reality—as 
they do drafting the indenture.75 The SEC imposes restraints of 
plain language on prospectuses, though those are rarely met.76 
In the case of Regulation AB, which specifies additional re-
quirements for asset-backed securities prospectuses for regis-
tered, publicly offered products, there are requirements to dis-
close the indenture as well as to provide diagrams and 
aggregate statistics if they would be useful.77 However, while 
the reading level can be lowered in the prospectus and instanc-
es of “heretofore” reduced in number, these waterfalls are in-
herently complex and made only more so by the contractual 
depiction. 
Structurers and other parties to the deal also create pre-
dictive models in tools like Intex and CDO Edge for purposes of 
analyzing the risk in the cash flow against past asset perfor-
mance and assumptions about the exogenous world (i.e., inter-
est rates).78 These tools do not usually analyze the actual static 
or dynamic pool of assets included in the specific deal, and in-
stead use past asset information and information from other 
deals.79 They also apply various mathematical stress tests.80 
 
75. Id. at 1640-42. 
76. 17 C.F.R. § 230.421(b), § 230.421(b) note (2013). 
77. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.1103-.1113 (2013); see also supra notes 14, 67 and 
accompanying text. 
78. Letter from Kevin F. McCarthy, supra note 43, at 6 (“[I]ssuers will 
often make available their waterfall to actual or potential investors. We esti-
mate that as many as 80% of deals are modeled by the dealer, with the issuer 
then subsequently, and in timely fashion, providing the model to the inves-
tor.”); see also CDOEdge - A CDO Credit Model, MOODY’S ANALYTICS 1 (2011), 
http://www.moodysanalytics.com/~/media/Brochures/Structured-Analytics-
Valuation/CDOEdge/CDOEdge-Brochure.ashx. 
79. See, e.g., Cashflow Models and Data, INTEX, 
http://www.intex.com/main/solutions_cashflow.php (last visited Jan. 12, 2014) 
(explaining that Intex sells data products that reflect historical performance 
of CDOs as well as that attempt to keep up with information released on a 
specific product in investor reports). 
80. See, e.g., Global Regions, INTEX, 
http://www.intex.com/main/solutions_markets.php (last visited Jan. 12, 2014) 
(“Each model contains the relevant cashflow characteristics of the deal, 
thereby enabling our users to apply their own prepayment, default, delin-
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Credit rating agencies use these predictions to calculate credit 
risk and advise structurers on how to improve credit ratings of 
the products.81 Sophisticated investors also use, or others use 
on their behalf, these predictive modeling tools in order to ana-
lyze hypothetical risk as well as the structure of the waterfall.82 
The models are often programmed by third-party vendors, like 
Intex, and then are put into large databases of models.83 
Currently, predictive models do not have the same legal 
potency as disclosures,84 and companies, such as Intex who 
build these models, strongly oppose efforts by the SEC to have 
these or other models treated like legally relevant disclosures.85 
In 2010, the SEC proposed that issuers should have to disclose 
custom-programmed Python-language86 models of the water-
falls for the same purpose, and that these models be subject to 
significant testing and verification.87 These models would cre-
 
81. John M. Griffin & Dragon Yongjun Tang, Did Subjectivity Play a 
Role in CDO Credit Ratings?, 67 J. FIN. 1293, 1297-99 (2012). 
82. See Letter from Kevin F. McCarthy, supra note 43, at 6. 
83. See id. 
84. Id. at 4-5. 
85. Id. 
86. Python is a common general programming language used in every-
thing from websites server-side processing to scientific computing. Organiza-
tions Using Python, PYTHON WIKI, 
http://wiki.python.org/moin/OrganizationsUsingPython (last updated July 2, 
2013). 
87. Asset-backed Securities, Securities Act Release No. 33-9117, Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-61858, 75 Fed. Reg. 23,328, 23,378-80 (proposed 
May 3, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 229, 230, 232, 239, 240, 
243, & 249). The London Stock Exchange has implemented a more flexible 
version of predictive model disclosure requirements in Market Notice - De-
tailed Eligibility Requirements for Residential Mortgage Backed Securities 
and Covered Bonds Backed by Residential Mortgages, BANK OF ENGLAND ¶¶ 
26-28, annex B (Nov. 30, 2010), 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/marketnotice121002abs
.pdf. For securitized products based on residential mortgages, a waterfall in 
some form as well as asset-pool data must be disclosed and meet certain re-
quirements. Id. Similar rules have been promulgated for commercial mort-
gage loans backed securities, small business corporate loans backed securi-
ties, auto loan backed securities, consumer loan backed securities, leasing 
backed securities, asset-backed commercial paper securities. See Sterling 
Monetary Framework - Eligible Collateral, BANK OF ENGLAND, 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Pages/money/eligiblecollateral.aspx 
(last visited Jan. 12, 2014) (follow “Detailed Information Transparency” hy-
21
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ate legal liability to the degree that they do not align with the 
functional reality of cash flow distribution, and presumably 
would also create legal problems if they conflicted with the pro-
spectus or the indenture itself.88 Vendors do not currently 
guarantee that the predictive model is an accurate depiction of 
the legal or functional reality, and there are often program-
ming errors as well as inaccuracies in depictions.89 
Then there is the functional reality (what Professor Hu 
calls the “effective reality”90), which are created by depictions 
used by the trustee to distribute cash flow. These can be made 
in spreadsheet tools, like Excel, using a combination of formu-
las, macros written in Visual Basic, and separate programs 
written in other languages that feed data into Excel.91 Some 
trustees use tools like CDOnet Trustee that serve a similar 
purpose by more closely integrating with the cash flow water-
fall models used to create the predictive models.92 Intuitively, 
functional depictions suffer from the same problems of transla-
tion as predictive models. As Professor Hu and members of in-
dustry have observed, participants in industry take such slip-
pages between legal and functional reality as givens.93 
Spreadsheets are error-prone and do not encourage good soft-
ware design practices.94 Additionally, programming a model to 
 
perlinks under the heading “Information Transparency” to open each PDF for 
the various types of securities mentioned). Australia has also made a similar 
move, requiring disclosure of a Visual Basic for Applications-based waterfall 
for residential mortgage backed securities. Finalisation of New Eligibility 
Criteria for Residential Mortgage Backed Securities, RESERVE BANK OF 
AUSTRALIA (Apr. 19, 2013), http://www.rba.gov.au/media-releases/2013/mr-13-
08.html. 
88. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (explaining the legal struc-
ture of disclosure liability, including liability for representations that would 
be made under a revision of Regulation AB). 
89. See Letter from Kevin F. McCarthy, supra note 43, at 4-5. 
90. Hu, supra note 4, at 1642. 
91. SMITH & WINCHIE, supra note 8, at 19. 
92. CDOnet, supra note 44, at 3. 
93. Hu, supra note 4, at 1638-42; see also Estrada & Karen, supra note 
40, at 13. 
94. C.C. MOUNFIELD, SYNTHETIC CDOS: MODELLING, VALUATION, AND RISK 
MANAGEMENT 240 (2009). The European Spreadsheet Risks Interest Group 
has collected “horror stories” of the problems stemming from using spread-
sheets to do critical analyses in finance and elsewhere. Horror Stories, 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/8
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reflect all contingencies can impose a burden if written in Excel 
rather than programmed in specialized software, so current 
functional depictions often neglect to include all relevant condi-
tions.95 Returning to the J.P. Morgan and Simpson Thacher ar-
ticle on private equity waterfalls: 
 
If we add to all of this the effect of increasingly 
complex fund terms and structures, it is clear 
that the time is now past when we can hope to 
rely with any confidence on the ability of a lone 
back-office worker—often armed solely with an 
Excel spreadsheet—to correctly implement the 
provisions of this critical legal documentation.96 
The takeaway is that, as Professor Hu and others have 
recognized, depicting structured finance agreements, and in 
particular the waterfalls and their inputs, can create signifi-
cant inaccuracy relative to some absolute hypothetical truth, 
desired reality, legal reality, or functional reality. And, fur-
thermore, these depictions are imprecise with respect to one 
another. 
 
2.  Incongruous Depictions Yield Imprecise Perception and  
     Imperceptible Future Realities 
 
As the previous section demonstrates, there are many in-
congruous depictions of structured financial products. These 
slippages create two levels of problems. First, it becomes hard 
to perceive any given reality, particularly in the future (or even 
present) legal and functional realities.97 Second, because these 
two realities are themselves dissimilar and because the legal 
 
EUSPRIG: EUROPEAN SPREADSHEET RISKS INTEREST GROUP, 
http://www.eusprig.org/horror-stories.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). 
95. See Hu, supra note 4, at 1639. 
96. Estrada & Karen, supra note 40, at 13. 
97. This argument is derived from the ABA’s point in their comments on 
proposed Regulation AB’s Python proposal that the SEC’s proposed pro-
grammatic models are merely predictive, and those predictive models are 
thus simply another potential source of confusion. See Letter from Jeffrey W. 
Rubin, supra note 14, at 58-59. 
23
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reality presumably ever more strongly influences and eventual-
ly usurps functional reality in the event of a legal dispute and 
eventual legal decision, dealmakers cannot perceive the future 
functional reality even if they could perceive the separate fu-





Figure 3. The Conventional Model in a Legal 
Dispute 
 
When the Conventional Model from Figure 1 enters 
into a dispute, the legal depictions and thus the legal 
reality trump the other depictions and thus define the 
functional reality. 
 
The first challenge facing dealmakers anticipating the 
functional reality for risk evaluation and the trustees executing 
these deals is that each of the two most relevant realities—
legal and functional—are difficult to precisely or accurately 
perceive because there are multiple potentially inaccurate de-
pictions that could be a given reality’s source. Take, for in-
stance, the legal reality. The indenture agreement and other 
relevant contracts should dictate the legally relevant structure 
of the waterfall. They presumably represent a meeting of the 
minds that purportedly occurs between the parties when mak-
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/8
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ing CDO deals about the waterfall, among other terms.98 And 
yet, as discussed in the previous section, these deal documents 
often intentionally or accidentally suffer from ambiguity even 
in parts like the waterfalls that should be relatively procedural 
in nature.99 Furthermore, often multiple relevant deal docu-
ments feed into the structure of the waterfall, a problem that 
itself introduces ambiguity in the structure of the deal. 
Adding to the legal confusion, there are also the prospec-
tuses or circulars and their exhibits, which themselves can be 
inconsistent relative to the contract (or vice versa) as well as 
potentially ambiguous and internally contradictory within 
themselves.100 And, through liability for prospectus misrepre-
sentations, these prospectuses and related attachments also 
become legally relevant to the structure of the agreement de-
spite attempts to avoid that by incorporating the indenture by 
reference into the prospectus.101 Finally, if treated as legally 
relevant (à la the prospectus), disclosures of either the indus-
try’s predictive models (e.g., Intex), the SEC’s predictive Py-
thon models, or even Professor Hu’s impliedly proposed disclo-
sure of the actual program used by the trustee to manage cash 
flows,102 liability for each of these additional disclosures adds 
even further to the uncertainty about how all of the parts will 
sift into the legal reality. 
But intra- and inter-document inconsistencies and vagar-
ies provide only the first part of the first problem of perceiving 
what the legal reality is. The future legal reality becomes fuzz-
ier in light of the risk of a tribunal—a court or arbitrator—
resolving the dispute. When courts interpret a contract or in-
denture, they quite often face the same challenges of interpre-
tation as do the parties administering the document because 
they are not experts in the field. As a result, the outcome can 
 
98. But see supra note 13 and accompanying text (criticizing the idea 
that indentures represent a meeting of the minds). 
99. See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text (discussing CDO draft-
ing difficulties). 
100. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text (addressing prospec-
tus drafting difficulties). 
101. Darmstadter, supra note 67, at 30-31. 
102. See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
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be unpredictable.103 If arbitrators take on the task of assigning 
meaning to (or gap-filling) a contract, then, in light of the ab-
sence of precedent or even useful persuasive authority on these 
agreements’ language, arbitrators’ decisions would be partially 
unpredictable.104 Even aspects of the deal like waterfalls, which 
are procedural and presumably deterministic, are subject to 
many possible meanings.105 Only when a definitive interpreta-
tion arises and is given compulsory force has the legal reality 
been discovered. 
Examples of ambiguous or vague waterfalls abound in the 
courts and elsewhere.106 In one, a CDO in deferral—i.e., not 
paying interest—had a waterfall that did not specify at which 
step the deferred interest should be paid.107 The waterfall 
placed various classes’ interest payments before all classes’ 
 
103. In fact, it is not entirely clear when a court versus a jury (or judge 
as fact-finder) should interpret a contract. See Kenneth R. Berman & J. 
Charles Mokriski, Judge, Jury, or Anybody’s Guess: Who Decides What a Con-
tract Means, 50 BOS. B. J., 10, 11 (2006) (“While these principles are easy 
enough to state, it is difficult to predict whether a court will find conflicting 
interpretations reasonable and let the question go to the fact-finder, or find 
one interpretation unreasonable and pick the other as a matter of law.”). Fur-
thermore, in the case of incomplete contracts that do not address all possible 
contingencies, one scholar has recognized that courts (and by implication ar-
bitrators) are not the best entities for filling in the gaps. Gillian K. Hadfield, 
Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of Incomplete Contracts, 23 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 159, 160-64 (1994). 
104. Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpreta-
tion, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1609 (2005). 
105. See R.J. Capital, S.A. v. Lexington Capital Funding III, Ltd., No. 10 
Civ. 25(PGG), 2013 WL 1294515, at *8-12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2013) (declaring 
ambiguous indenture language about under what circumstances a waterfall 
would apply in the event of a funding request); Bank of N.Y. Trust, N.A., v. 
Franklin Advisers, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 2d 458, 464-66 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (resolv-
ing disputes over indenture terms determining whether alternative waterfall 
should apply in the case of an optional redemption and whether that redemp-
tion should be included in the calculation of a payment); Cypress Assocs., 
LLC v. Sunnyside Cogeneration Assocs. Project, No. Civ.A. 1607-N, 2007 WL 
148754, at *4-14 (Del. Ch. Jan. 17, 2007) (belaboring the point that a non-
CDO indenture waterfall was irresolvably ambiguous without parol evi-
dence); see also Eric Adams et al., New Woes for CDOs: The Effect of the Sub-
prime Crisis on Real Estate CDOs and the Opportunity it Presents, REAL EST. 
RESTRUCTURING & REORG. GUIDE, May 2008, at 12-14. 
106. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
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principal distributions, and did not specify whether deferred 
interest constituted interest or principal in its definitions.108 If 
deferred interest was interest, then lower tranche bondholders 
would receive their deferred interest before senior bondholders 
were paid their principal.109 On the other hand, call it princi-




Figure 4. The Predictive Disclosure  
Model in Dispute 
 
Just as in the Conventional Model, when the Predic-
tive Disclosure Model enters dispute, it competes with 
the other legal depictions to define the legal and thus 
functional reality. 
 
Ambiguity can also crop up in the calculation of the collat-
eral value input for the waterfall’s overcollateralization test. 
An overcollateralization test determines whether the CDO has 
a certain amount of assets beyond the tranche principal speci-





111. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Barclays Bank Plc’s Motion 
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adjusted to reflect their lower quality as collateral.112 This ad-
justment is called a haircut, the amount of which is specified in 
the indenture.113 These assets are actively evaluated by the 
credit rating agencies, and one or more of the agencies could 
decrease an asset rating.114 This creates ambiguity.115 Where 
the indenture specifies when a haircut should apply, the word 
“or” may be used: if S&P or Moody’s downgrades an asset below 
a certain standard, then apply the haircut.116 The parties in-
tend that when both agencies downgrade an asset it enters a 
state of default, but lawyers use “or” to take into account situa-
tions where there is only one rating available. Most of the time 
this is not a problem, but frequently the ratings diverge. In 
these cases, whether an asset should have the haircut applied, 
and thus whether the overcollateralization test is passed, de-
pends upon whether or not “or” means “and,” or, alternatively, 
whether “or” simply defines the possible members of the set of 
credit ratings but not the test itself.117 A related problem that 
can arise in this same context is that the indenture and the 
functional implementation accidentally apply the haircut twice, 
once for each credit rating agency’s downgrade, when in fact it 
is only supposed to be applied once.118 
 
for Summary Judgment at 5-6, U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Barclays Bank PLC, 
No. 11 Civ. 9199(WHP), 2013 WL 1180414, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2013) 
(No. 11 Civ. 9199), 2012 WL 5272325 [hereinafter Motion for Summary 
Judgment]; see also U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Barclays Bank PLC, No. 11 Civ. 
9199(WHP), 2013 WL 1180414, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2013). 
112. See, e.g., id. at 5-7. 
113. See, e.g., id. 
114. See, e.g., id. 
115. The Barclays Bank’s motion papers and case are cited in notes 111-
114, supra, solely in order to provide example of the ambiguous haircut crite-
ria about to be described. The decision and pleadings in this case do not con-
cern this ambiguity directly. Instead, the following high-level examples of 
waterfall ambiguities are based on a discussion with an industry expert who 
asked to remain anonymous. 
116. See, e.g., Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 111, at 5-7 
(discussing that the indenture in this case specified that either a downgrade 
by Moody’s or by S&P would result in an event of default); see also supra note 
115 and accompanying text. 
117. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
118. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/8
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This legal ambiguity leads to the second problem of percep-
tion: parties face equal difficulty perceiving the future func-
tional reality. Assume, for a moment, that the legal reality does 
not dictate directly how cash distributions in the waterfall will 
occur. In that case, disclosures currently provide only the pre-
dictive reality of what might happen given certain conditions. 
If the model disclosed is not the actual tool used by the trustee 
to parcel out cash to beneficiaries of the indenture and equity 
holders (and we know from the previous section that the vari-
ous models yield potentially different results), a disclosure of a 
predictive model can only provide accurate and precise infor-
mation about that predictive reality. 119 Everything the model 
says about the functional depiction is an estimate (or guess) 
that might not hold up under important conditions, like de-
fault, just as models failed to hold up in the build-up and af-
termath of the financial crisis like in the cases discussed 
above.120 Instead, the only way to know the behavior of the 
functional model is to disclose the functional model, as Profes-




119. See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
120. See cases cited supra note 105. 
121. Hu, supra note 4, at 1642-43. Professor Hu says his goal is a pure 
information disclosure model. Id. While he then proceeds to discuss the SEC’s 
Python-proposal, id. at 1646, 1680-81, that proposal is inherently not a pure 
information model. It is, as discussed above, a predictive model special-made 
for prediction of risk. But it is not the model that will be used to execute. So it 
is not, despite Professor Hu’s lengthy discussion of the SEC’s proposed rule, 
the Python proposal is not a real example of pure information. Therefore, this 
Article aims to give Professor Hu’s conceptual model more bite than he 
seemed to give it credit for, and read “pure information” to mean the disclo-
sure of the model or code actually used to execute the deal and the cash dis-
tributions. Because this description of a pure information proposal is arrived 
at by implication from Hu’s conceptual model, in Part III, this Article first 
fills in some details about what prerequisites must be attained to get the 
most out of a pure information disclosure. Only after coloring in the amor-
phous lines of a pure information disclosure regime does this Article then go 
on to pivot away from disclosure and deal with the perception problem by re-
considering the deal structure, the types of investors who should participate 
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Figure 5. The Hu-esque “Pure Information” 
Model In Dispute 
 
Like in Figure 4, the Hu “pure information” model 
simply adds another competing depiction, and in the 
end however the court churns the butter of depictions 
to determine the legal reality will control the func-
tional reality.  
 
Ultimately, Professor Hu’s “pure information” proposal’s 
implied practical implementation actually provides only yet 
another predictive model because,122 taking away the assump-
tion of the last paragraph, the legal reality will in fact trump 
the functional model in the event of a dispute between the debt 
holders, equity holders, and the trustee. When a dispute arises 
about the trustee’s waterfall payouts—and disputes have aris-
en123—the final legal interpretation and ensuing order to the 
 
122. This argument owes its origination to the American Bar Associa-
tion’s comment to the SEC’s Python proposal, and holds equally valid as a re-
ply to the solution implied by Professor Hu’s argument. Letter from Jeffrey 
W. Rubin, supra note 14, at 57. 
123. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (listing cases of courts 
interpreting waterfalls in CDOs and other similar indentures). For an over-
view of litigation strategies and a list of CDO cases that are in part related to 
contractual ambiguity in the indenture, see American and English Perspec-
tives on CDO Litigation, JONES DAY 1-62 (March 2008), 
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/8
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trustee will prevail over whatever structure the trustee had 
previously implemented as the functional reality.124 The trus-
tee must interpret that order as a new document and must cre-
ate another functional depiction (and thus another functional 
reality) to reflect its interpretation of that order. In fact, intui-
tively, the act of perceiving and implementing the order will 
face similar challenges as the problems of perceiving the origi-
nal indenture used in the first place.125 In any case, this poten-
tial legal risk means that even if the actual functional model of 
the waterfall is disclosed to an investor and any other relevant 
party, as has been suggested might be desirable, the fact of the 
legal reality’s existence and power to trump that functional re-
ality makes the future functional reality difficult to perceive 
accurately. 
The necessary result of these difficulties of perception is 
that disclosure merely facilitates predictive triangulation onto 
what the future reality will be, and, like most predictions, that 
predictive reality is inaccurate relative to the actual functional 
reality and imprecise between the various predictive depiction 
sources. 
 
3. Indefinite Reality Creates Business, Legal, and Systemic  
    Risks 
 
Because the future functional and legal realities remain 
uncertain with respect to waterfalls, CDOs and similarly struc-
tured arrangements face related material business and legal 
risks. 
From the business perspective of the structure and issuer, 
deal documents and indentures make for poor specification di-




124. Trustees file interpleader actions in order to have a judge settle the 
correct interpretation of the indenture. Eric S. Adams, CDOs in the Financial 
Crisis, 15 J. STRUCTURED FIN. 11, 12 (2010). 
125. Cf. Scott Moïse, Plain English, S.C. LAWYER, Nov. 2002, at 49, 50 
(referring to applying the same rules of interpretation to court orders as are 
applied to statutes and contracts). 
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“f(x)” rather than the “heretofore” and “dispute, controversy, or 
claim” for a reason: the model is a better guide for analyzing 
risks and eventually building the tools that the trustee will use 
to distribute cash than the written, legal transactional docu-
ments. And yet the business managers must devote their time 
and money to contributing to the creation of the language and 
then at least try to ensure that the tools and predictive models 
they build reflect the legal depiction rather than the more use-
ful depiction. Through these many translations, the original 
business objective can be lost and energy is wasted in an effort 
to make “complete” deal documents as well as the rest of the 
tools.126 Error is inevitable and thus the structurer’s ability to 
understand its risks becomes tainted through that imperfec-
tion. 
The investor faces similar risks. The investor wants to 
know the future functional reality. That future functional reali-
ty of the waterfall is imperceptible in the status quo, as dis-
cussed in the previous section.127 If the investor did not have to 
expend its money and time analyzing waterfall structures and 
related aspects of the indenture, it might instead devote those 
resources to assessing risks outside of the waterfall structure, 
such as the quality of the representations made by the issuer 
and sponsor about the underlying assets.128 As matters now 
stand, in a world of limited resources, the investor must at-
tempt to perceive both the risks in the waterfall reality and the 
risks in the underlying assets. Its inability to perceive the fu-
ture functional waterfall reality is a risk. Furthermore, the dis-
traction of the waterfall risk hampers its already (and always) 
imperfect knowledge of the real economy risks it faces by in-
 
126. Estrada & Karen, supra note 40, at 13. 
127. See supra Part II.B.2. 
128. While this is only a counterfactual, perhaps institutional investors 
would have been caught less flatfooted had they paid their attorneys and 
bankers to engage in due diligence of the assets underlying CDOs rather than 
analysis of the legal payout structure—though considering that institutional 
investors apparently did not even use the data they were given, perhaps that 
is a pipe dream. See Kevin G. Brolley, Occupy the Buy Side: Institutional In-
vestors Deserve Far More Blame For the Financial Crisis, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 
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vesting in a given CDO. This is an inefficient use of its re-
sources and increases the business and legal risk faced by the 
investor. 
The trustee and servicer also face risk in this management 
of the indenture’s cash flow.129 The trustee must monitor that 
waterfall distributions occur according to the terms of the in-
denture using tools that it built to some extent in concert with 
the sponsor.130 It also must ensure other conditions of the in-
denture governing asset quality and management are met.131 
But when there is a dispute, the trustee can find itself at the 
center of the fight between senior and junior tranches of the 
CDO over contractual terms about the various tests and other 
decision-points in the waterfall.132 The inherent instability of 
the interpretation of the indenture means that a once accepta-
ble arrangement to all parties involved can, in the right (or 
wrong) context, become a legal risk to the trustee. Just as with 
the other parties to the deal, the trustee can find itself in court 
over its implementation or over the demands placed upon it to 
reinterpret parts of the indenture by majority holders of the 
senior tranche.133 
Taking the broader view of the markets for these products, 
the inability to perceive how a CDO waterfall will function in 
various circumstances limits the ability of market participants, 
clearinghouses, exchanges, self-regulatory entities, and gov-
ernment regulators to perceive the market in these products. A 
 
129. See Coughlin, supra note 46, at 1-2. 
130. For example, U.S. Bank’s Global Corporate Trust Services provides 
the technology to provide “[c]ash flow modeling and payment distribution” as 
a “CDO trustee.” Products and Services - CDO and Securities Services, US 
BANK, 
https://usbtrustgateway.usbank.com/portal/public/collDebtObligSvcs.do (last 
visited Jan. 14, 2014). 
131. See Nicola Cetorelli & Stavros Peristiani, The Role of Banks in As-
set Securitization, 18 ECON. POL’Y REV. 47, 58 (2012) (stating that trustee’s 
“sole purpose is to represent the investor”), available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/12v18n2/1207peri.pdf. 
132. Professor Steven L. Schwarz discusses the difficulties of the trustee 
as fiduciary during “tranche warfare” and provides an example of this type of 
conflict generally in Steven L. Schwarz, Fiduciaries with Conflicting Obliga-
tions, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1867, 1870–72 (2010). 
133. See Coughlin, supra note 46, at 8-11. 
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contract or indenture must be translated into a predictive or 
functional model in order to be stress tested for its sensitivity 
to various inputs and conditions of underlying assets and other 
factors in the real economy. Under the status quo, predictive 
models are available for analysis against past data sets, but 
they suffer from the problems of inaccurate depiction and im-
precise perception discussed earlier.134 As such, the market in 
these products is relatively more imperceptible than it could be 
if the waterfalls were perceivable. If they were perceivable, 
they could be connected with the ever more granular, accurate, 
and timely information about underlying assets, real economy 
data, and market position data. This interconnect would permit 
more accurate predictive models of the market to be created 
and analyzed and in doing so, would reduce systemic risk to 
participants and those indirectly harmed by their risk-taking 
choices. 
Written contracts make poor specifications for structured 
finance’s more procedural aspects, like CDO indenture water-
falls. They inaccurately depict the desired reality and do not fa-
cilitate accurate or precise perception and creation of the func-
tional reality. And because accurate perception of the future 
legal reality is necessary to accurately predict the future func-
tional reality, their ineffectiveness at permitting perception of 
the relevant realities imposes risk both upon the parties to the 
deals and the system as a whole. 
 
III. Make the Functional Depiction of the Waterfall the Legal 
Reality, Reducing Legal, Business, and Systemic Risks 
 
Dealmakers structuring CDO waterfalls and other similar-
ly procedural and numerical processes—e.g., calculating over-
collateralization, interest rate test, cash allocation, etc.—
should follow the lead of construction law practitioners and 
adopt the functional depiction by reference in the legal depic-
tion. Furthermore, in order to maximize the portion of the in-
denture or contract that can be usefully expressed in an auto-
mated functional depiction like a program or Excel file, the 
 
134. See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/8
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CDO should be structured to minimize human intervention and 
discretion to few or no points in the waterfall and its inputs. By 
defining the waterfall and its related inputs through reference 
to its blueprint—the functional depiction that will be used by 
the trustee to distribute cash—the legal reality will then equal 
the functional reality. Because the functional depiction is nec-
essarily determinative as a programmatic representation, it 
will not suffer from the same problems of perception that the 
written contract does, and this combined future legal and func-
tional reality will not suffer from the imperceptibility of a writ-
ten contract. This will reduce the risk to market participants 
and the financial system caused by an inability to perceive de-
finitively the future functional and legal realities of an inden-
ture waterfall. 
Part A below will explain in greater detail a proposal to in-
clude the functional depiction by reference in structured fi-
nance contracts and will explain the benefits for dealmakers 
and parties to these agreements of using that model.135 Part B 
will address whether regulatory agencies should require water-
falls and similar procedural arrangements to be made in this 
way and whether they can do so as a matter of law.136 Part B 
will also address what role the bankruptcy regime might play 
in this proposal’s viability.137 
 
A.    Dealmakers Should Contract for Waterfalls through Nego-
tiations About the Programmatic Functional Depictions 
 
This Article’s proposal has three parts, two instrumental 
proposals and one ultimate proposal, the latter of which the 
former two facilitate. First, minimize the amount of unneces-
sary discretion and imperfect specification intentionally includ-
ed in CDO indentures and analogous arrangements. Second, 
structurers and other dealmakers should automate the water-
fall portion of the contract using Excel, proprietary software, or 
other tools. This is facilitated by the reduction in the number of 
 
135. See infra Part III.A. 
136. See infra Part III.B. 
137. See infra Part III.B.3. 
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points of human discretion involved in what should otherwise 
be a very procedural waterfall cash distribution process. Final-
ly, these models, built as part of the deal-making process, 
should be incorporated by reference as the legally determina-
tive blueprints of the waterfall to the exclusion of other depic-
tions. This new approach to a legal depiction of waterfalls 
would reduce initial legal costs as well as legal risks. Accord-
ingly, it is a desirable business change for structurers, inves-
tors, and trustees alike. 
 
1. Minimize Discretion Where It Does Not Independently  
    Add Value 
 
As discussed earlier, CDO indentures often suffer from 
many levels of ambiguity introduced throughout the design 
process and often include discretion solely for the purpose of 
overcoming drafting challenges.138 Reducing unnecessary dis-
cretion will limit the problem of slippage and facilitate a pro-
grammatic representation of a waterfall. While nothing inher-
ent in the nature of a programmatic depiction limits the 
opportunities for human intervention, the greater the amount 
of human manipulation of data and processes, and the more 
discretion introduced into a program, the less it resolves the 
problem of contractual depictions. Therefore, those planning 
the desired structure of CDO waterfalls and inputs should min-
imize discretion to expressly limited points in the structure 
where human judgment adds value to the product. 
Qualitative and subjective judgments seemingly do not add 
value, for example, to resolving the question of whether the 
overcollateralization or interest tests in the waterfall have been 
met. Nor does discretion add value if it concerns the meaning of 
default in the context of standardized underlying assets where 
all parties know what they think constitutes a defaulted asset. 
Similarly, if the CDO itself has defaulted and that affects the 
choice of waterfall,139 discretion does not belong in that judg-
 
138. See supra Part II.B. 
139. Greg B. Cioffi, Collateralized Damage, DAILY DEAL, Feb. 1, 2008, 
available at 2008 WLNR 1910083. 
36http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/8
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ment and results should instead be determined according to 
certain specified rules based on the underlying cash flows and 
asset classes. The question in these cases is often whether cash 
available for interest payments is greater or less than that due 
or whether the overcollateralization test has or has not been 
met for underlying assets.140 These are not questions in need of 
human judgment any more than the question of whether five is 
greater than four. 
Participants in the deals creating these CDOs should rec-
ognize that discretion left in the hands of asset managers and 
even fiduciaries like the trustees creates business risk.141 While 
discretion in asset management can add value, discretion in 
the hands of the trustee in the context of the cash distribution 
waterfall and inputs such as default status probably does not. 
Discretion in the hands of a trustee is a great deal like the 
court’s or arbitrator’s power of interpretation. It creates prob-
lems of perception of the future functional reality. Thinking 
along the same lines as the Theory of Second Best, as soon as 
more than one dimension is not measurable or, more common-
ly, is restricted from being optimal in a multidimensional set-
ting, the interaction between the different dimensions makes 
predicting the result of changing another factor difficult.142 Dis-
 
140. Id. 
141. This proposal has independent value even in the event that the sec-
ond and third proposals are not followed. Failure to tackle ambiguity and 
leave effective discretion in execution in the hands of trustees has and will 
continue to create business and legal risks for the reasons already discussed. 
142. The general theory of second best had one of its earliest explana-
tions in R. G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 
24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956). A more approachable explanation is: 
 
The problem of second best deals with the question of 
whether interventions directed at specific market imperfec-
tions can improve overall social welfare. According to the 
theory of second best, correcting specific market imperfec-
tions while leaving others untouched will not necessarily 
improve social welfare. . . . 
 
The theory of second best in general states that in a system 
where conditions are such that a Pareto optimum exists, if 
one condition is changed so that it is no longer at its opti-
mum state, then to reach a second best optimum (because 
37
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cretion adds infinite possibilities on one dimension and adds 
yet another layer of complexity to any stress testing analysis 
done upon a security. And when those points of discretion do 
not specify criteria for the decision-making process or leave 
broad (perhaps even carte blanche) discretion to accommodate 
unpredicted future circumstances, risk is taken on by the par-
ties. 
Those tasked with limiting discretion might respond that 
it is necessary to leave discretion to cope with the unknown. 
That is not true. There should be no unknown inputs. Struc-
tured financial products effectively define a function f(x1, x2, . . . 
, xn) where n is less than infinity (often, far closer to zero). The 
numbers of variables n can never approach infinity because the 
sponsors designing the financial model lack infinite time and 
infinite mental capacity to conceive of such a model that takes 
an infinite number of inputs. And every input into the model is 
placed into the model intentionally as a variable cannot write 
itself into a model, contract, or program. Models are by defini-
tion simple depictions of a more complex reality, but in the case 
of these waterfalls this simplified reality creates and defines 
the extent of the actual reality of cash flow distribution. As an 
example, in the Great Recession, financial participants did not 
fail to understand their inputs; rather, they misestimated the 
reasonable ranges of the inputs.143 Moreover, if within the func-
tion there are not conditions to cope with, for example, situa-
tions where x1, which could be asset default, is greater than 
even a conservative analyst might allow for (say, because the 
correlation of housing foreclosures was greater than anyone 
 
the first best optimum cannot be reached), all the other con-
ditions must be changed from their original first best opti-
mum states. 
 
Joseph Rebello, The Problem of Second Best: Are Partial Equilibrium and 
Third-Best Analyses Solutions?, U. CHI. (May 15, 2002), 
http://home.uchicago.edu/~rposner/rebello2.htm. 
143. Even those who will likely oppose a proposal like the one made in 
this Article agree with this point. For an accessible discussion of poor predic-
tion of housing price correlation as one of the (many) causes of the Great Re-
cession, see Felix Salmon, Recipe for Disaster: The Formula that Killed Wall 
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expected144), then that possibility, however removed, should be 
able to accounted for, even if it is accounted for by defaulting 
on the CDO to the detriment of all of the relevant parties. It 
might require more work, but it is little more than asking that 
when those designing structured financial instruments decide 
what they want to do when x1 > 50 they should also decide 
what to do with x1 ≤ 50 rather than leaving that decision for the 
day disaster strikes.145 The cost in up front effort is not tre-
mendous, and the benefit in risk reduction and perception is 
substantial. 
There might be an unknown variable xn+1 that was not and 
could not be anticipated at the time the model was made but 
that should or will have an effect on the cash flow distribution 
of f(x1, x2, . . . , xn). But, in fact, a mechanical process of deter-
mining cash flows according to collateralization, money availa-
ble to pay interest and other costs is, as demonstrated above, a 
determinative process, and the parties can be expected to have 
determined how the relevant criteria will affect outputs. The 
only way that xn+1 can affect output is if one or more of the set 
of variables {x1 . . . xn} is a function of xn+1, xn(xn+1). Unless xn+1 
represents some exogenous legal power from another part of 
the contract or from outside of the contract, the same argument 
made above applies here: parties should anticipate how they 
will react to the entire range of possible values of, for example, 
xn, and if they do, then they can cope with any output of xn = 
xn(xn+1). If xn+1 is an external business or legal factor that 
trumps the waterfall, then this Article’s proposed removal of 
discretion cannot address that directly. Removing discretion 
from the waterfall does not remove the potential need for dis-
cretion outside of the waterfall in the business structure of the 
CDO, even though that weakens the power of the overall pro-
posal to minimize risk. 
 
144. See, e.g., Letter from Kevin F. McCarthy, supra note 43, at 1-2 (“Ra-
ther, the problems arose from shoddy lending standards, inadequate disclo-
sure of loan level collateral detail . . . , and incorrect assumptions regarding 
housing prices and mortgage default rates by market participants.”). 
145. And they should take care not to make the same mistake as the au-
thor made in an early draft and test only for x > 50 and x < 50 while neglect-
ing x = 50. 
39
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2. Automate the Waterfalls and Interpretation of Inputs 
    Wherever Possible 
 
Reducing discretion maximizes the parts of the waterfalls 
and surrounding framework of inputs that can be automated. 
The more that quantitative data directly is fed into determina-
tive criteria, the less human intervention is required, and the 
more useful is an automated programmatic functional depic-
tion. The more the waterfall and the surrounding inputs, in-
cluding collateralization models for feeding into the overcollat-
eralization tests, are automated into a programmatic 
functional depiction, the greater the utility the functional de-
piction has for informing sponsors, investors, trustees, and 
regulators of how the cash distribution will actually change 
given different economic assumptions about the assets and ex-
ogenous factors. 
Automation is in principle a good choice for businesses be-
cause it reduces the need for trustees to hire large back-office 
staffs, which have a capacity for error,146 to manage inherently 
procedural cash flow processes.147 It also reduces liability aris-
ing from those likely mistakes. The effort to create manage-
ment systems to cope over the long run with the continuous 
risk of human error almost certainly equals the cost of upfront 
investment in building functional depictions to manage most 
cash flow processes. Admittedly, there are costs to developing 
 
146. See, e.g., PF2, Is your CDO Leaking, EXPECT[ED] LOSS (May 14, 
2009, 11:30 AM), http://expectedloss.blogspot.com/2009/05/is-your-cdo-
leaking.html (describing an instance of a CDO waterfall distribution being 
incorrectly calculated by $4 million because of a waterfall implementation 
error by the trustee). 
147. Others have considered the possibility of writing certain types of 
contracts in a formal language like programming code of pseudo-code, but 
none so literally as this Article proposes. Because the functional reality is lit-
erally created by code, waterfalls agreements can be expressed as operational 
code rather than simply formal language designed to reduce ambiguity. See, 
e.g., A Formal Language for Analyzing Contracts, NICK SZABO’S PAPERS AND 
CONCISE TUTORIALS (2002), http://szabo.best.vwh.net/contractlanguage.html 
(“The author presents a mini-language for professional and researches inter-
ested in drafting and analyzing contracts. It is intended for computers to 
read, too. The main purpose of this language is to, as unambiguously and 
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these systems initially, but those costs are likely minimized by 
the fact that currently there is already software on the market 
like CDOnet Trustee for managing many aspects of day-to-day 
cash distribution by the trustee and other parties. Because the 
tools already exist to build these models, it is important to shift 
that construction to a point in time before the transaction has 
been completed and to focus more resources on making sure 
that the automation is correctly designed. 
Programming these models does not mean removing hu-
man oversight, as might be mistakenly presumed. The trustee 
and the other parties and beneficiaries to the CDO have a role 
to monitor performance against predictive models in order to 
ensure that everything outside of the waterfall and its inputs 
operate correctly. Furthermore, just as with long-term manual 
data manipulation, these programs are, of course, man-made 
and thus subject to error. But, as the next section will discuss, 
all parties will and should refocus their analytical and error-
checking efforts towards ensuring that the functional depiction 
actually represents their desired functional reality.148 Also, 
there should always be the opportunity to renegotiate if the 
parties agree that the structuring suffers from an obvious pro-
grammatic error, but caveat emptor (buyer beware), caveat 
venditor (seller beware), and caveat commissarius149 (trustee 
beware) all need to apply if the functional depiction is to consti-
tute the legal reality. 
A question related to automation is whether the code 
should be open or closed to investors and regulators. Open 
source code, as distinct from the SEC’s emphasis in its Python 
proposal on using an “open source programming language,”150 
 
148. See infra Part III.A.3. 
149. Thanks to Shane Morgan, classics major extraordinaire, for bring-
ing structured finance to Ancient Rome. 
150. Asset-Backed Securities, Securities Act Release No. 33-9117, Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-61858, 75 Fed. Reg. 23,328, 23,380 (proposed May 
3, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 229, 230, 232, 239, 240, 243, & 
249). Open source code refers to the idea that the code can be seen by the rel-
evant parties rather than hidden behind a compiled binary executable. See 
The Open Source Definition, OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE, 
http://opensource.org/osd (last visited Jan. 16, 2014). What is important is not 
that the language be open source in the sense of the licensing agreement—
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is necessary for there to be productive, informed negotiations 
about the nature of the cash distribution. Many in the industry 
already release a great deal of modeling information to inves-
tors in this context,151 and the predictive models can be made to 
disclose the underlying code used to make them.152 There is no 
fruitful discussion of terms as well as a meaningful audit of the 
code, as is necessary to fairly implement a caveat emptor rule, 
without open code. The risks of open code, in terms of proprie-
tary methods, are minimal in light of what appears to be cur-
rent industry practice of sharing models. And the underlying 
data and analytical methods used to calculate some of the in-
puts, while they should likely also be open and disclosed, could 
be agreed upon by the parties to be treated as black boxed 
functions with open APIs153 if not integral to the structure of 
the waterfall indenture itself. 
 
which the open source community would disagree with, id.—but that the 
models themselves are open. Python in particular is a programming language 
the design and interpreter of which are open source. Python Programming 
Language—Official Web Site, PYTHON, http://www.python.org (last visited 
Jan. 16, 2014). In my mind, it is not as important that these models be de-
signed in an open source language as it is that the models themselves are 
open source/open code in whatever language best-suited for the industry. 
What is important is that there are a limited number of languages used and 
that the models themselves have some sort of standardized, non-obfuscated 
coding methodology. Code can be just as incomprehensible as the written 
word regardless of the language used. See, e.g., Obfuscated Python, P-NAND-
Q.COM, http://www.p-nand-q.com/programming/obfuscation/python/more.html 
(last visited Jan. 16, 2014). 
151. See Letter from Kevin F. McCarthy, supra note 43, at 6. 
152. See Larry Cordell et al., Collateral Damage: Sizing and Assessing 
the Subprime CDO Crisis 10 (Research Dep’t, Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., 
Working Paper No. 11-30/R, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1907299. 
153. API means Application Programming Interface, and is the collec-
tion of functions that a program makes “public” for use by other programs, 
versus functions that are accessible only internally within the program. 
MARTIN REDDY, API DESIGN FOR C++ 1-2 (2011). The relevance of an API (or 
an analogous structure by any other name) in this context is that an API 
permits a user or programmer to interface with already written and compiled 
code and order it to run certain commands and return certain results without 
revealing how the process works. While a black box is not desirable, it is fea-
sible and in fact is a common way to organize software even when the code is 
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Closed source models, while less desirable for purposes of 
active negotiation, could also be an option in general, though 
they would require extensive stress test based negotiation, 
which, because of the number of possible inputs and interac-
tions, could end up making the functional depiction effectively 
predictive for purposes of the negotiation. In a way, closed 
source would fall half-way between current practice and the 
present proposal, in that the functional reality would still be 
the legally determinative depiction, but the parties would nego-
tiate over its output rather than over the code itself. 
Open source without standardization of programming lan-
guage or modeling tool, interfaces, and outputs, just like a con-
tract or indenture without standardization, also poses serious 
challenges of comparability and comprehensibility. While this 
topic is beyond the scope of this Article, it seems likely that the 
industry would coalesce around a few products that already 
have a substantial infrastructure and network. Models with 
built-in tools like Intex, CDO Edge, and even Excel spread-
sheets are widely used, understood, and exchanged as means of 
providing predictive information to investors and other market 
participants.154 The market coalesced on these products natu-
rally and not as a result of regulation.155 Markets likewise 
should grow around a subset of products, and the industry 
should develop internal standards for presentation and inter-
face, especially as many of the investors have equal bargaining 








154. Letter from Kevin F. McCarthy, supra 43, at 2. 
155. Cf. History, INTEX, 
http://www.intex.com/main/company_history.php (last visited Jan. 16, 2014) 
(describing the product development of Intex without mention of it being giv-
en any regulatory advantage). 
43
  
392 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
 
 
Figure 6. The Code as Contract Model In and 
Out of Dispute 
 
By negotiating directly about the waterfall’s function-
al depiction and incorporating that depiction into the 
contract as well as using it to create the functional re-
ality, the functional reality and the legal reality be-
come equivalents.  
 
3. Make the Automated Waterfalls the Contract by  
    Reference 
 
These largely automated procedures, expressed in code 
with minimal discretion, should, like blueprints, replace the 
waterfall and surrounding input contract language as the legal 
depiction in CDO indentures and similar documents. By includ-
ing the functional depiction by reference in the legally binding 
contract as a substitute for written contractual depiction of the 
indenture waterfall and other procedural inputs, drafters will 
reconcile legal and functional depictions and thus reconcile le-
gal and functional realities. While the functional depiction 
might not perfectly match the desired reality, parties will at 
least focus on making sure that the implementation that will 
create the cash distribution regime is as accurate as possible, 
relative to the desired reality, and any limitations will be set 
out clearly in the implementing code. 
44http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/8
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This change to a legally binding functional depiction will 
reduce the problems of perceiving the future legal and func-
tional realities and thus decrease the legal risk faced by busi-
nesses. Rather than operating through legal intermediaries to 
structure and depict the waterfall and its inputs, structurers, 
investors, and other relevant parties can directly negotiate 
about whether the code or formulas represent both the method 
and results that they desire. This removes problems of lawyers 
depicting and describing waterfalls in the text of contracts and 
then of back-office programmers depicting contracts as code. It 
also removes the problem of perception because there is only 
one depiction to perceive, and that depiction is not subject to 
interpretation or dispute because of its very nature as deter-
ministic code. 
Furthermore, this change means that lawyers, advisors, 
and negotiators can focus on other, higher risk parts of the in-
denture and related agreements, like the guarantees for repre-
sentations about the underlying asset quality, as well as re-
viewing the quality of that information directly before settling 
the transaction. As an example, lawyers are better equipped to 
evaluate the quality of due diligence and secure against mis-
representations and other macro level risks to the deal than 
the nitty-gritty back-office procedures necessary to correctly 
calculate cash distributions. This proposal promotes a more ef-
ficient allocation of legal resources for the participants in the 
deal. 
This change to reduce legal risk for all parties needs a re-
inforced regime of caveat emptor, caveat venditor, and caveat 
commissarius. This means that parties who purchase these 
CDO bonds, build these bonds, and are paid to manage these 
bonds must retain the risk of verifying that the code reflects 
their desired reality. When these waterfall programs become 
subject to dispute about their result, many of the benefits of us-
ing code instead of language are lost because multiple potential 
realities can exist. But, if each participant retains the respon-
sibility of ensuring the code operates correctly, the code will be 
better vetted, the results will align better with the desired real-
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Of course, disputes will still exist about the remainder of 
the indenture that cannot be expressed in code. Questions of 
the meaning of certain asset structure requirements, points of 
discretion, and perhaps some of the inputs qualitative categori-
zation will remain. But there will be a reduced dispute or risk 
of dispute about the waterfall itself, which is a reduction in 
hazard faced by parties. Risks of misrepresentation and fraud 
will remain. Some party may claim to the tribunal that the 
code is not what they agreed to. That said, in this contractual 
regime, unless that party can prove something that generally 
voids the contract from principles of general contract law—
fraud, adhesion, etc.—tribunals should have little sympathy for 
that party’s inability to evaluate the code directly. 
That said, the regime of caveat emptor creates some con-
cerns for unsophisticated and relatively less sophisticated in-
vestors. It has been reported that even sophisticated investors 
in CDOs and other ABSs relied at times almost entirely upon 
statements about the waterfall structure in the circulars plus 
the credit ratings.156 And in particular, these investors relied 
upon the credit rating agencies’ evaluations of a particular 
tranche to determine the size and scope of the risk they 
faced.157 If sophisticated investors were unable or unwilling to 
assess directly the risk of the contracts and the predictive mod-
els, then it seems highly unlikely that individual or small, as 
well as less sophisticated investors, will have the capability to 
understand, let alone stress test, programmatically represent-
ed waterfall indentures. This indicates that, in order to maxim-
ize the benefits of the coding the contract regime and avoid ac-
cusations of abusing unsophisticated investors, CDO bond and 
share dealers should not deal to unsophisticated investors, an 
issue that will be discussed in the next part.158 
 
156. MELANIE L. FEIN, SECURITIES ACTIVITIES OF BANKS 13-7 (4th ed. 
Supp. 2013); Fanni Koszeg, Will CDO Managers Be Held Accountable for 
Their Role in the Financial Crisis?, BLOOMBERG LAW, 
http://about.bloomberglaw.com/law-reports/will-cdo-managers-be-held-
accountable/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2014). 
157. FEIN, supra note 156, at 13-7. 
158. See infra Part III.B.1. 
46http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/8
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Limiting the role of discretion will make it easier to per-
ceive the future legal and functional reality of complex cash 
distributions like those involved in CDOs. It will also facilitate 
automation, which in and of itself should be desirable for the 
structurers and other parties involved in creating CDOs. Au-
tomation will decrease the cost of manual management and 
human error, and in doing so is inherently a desirable business 
move for those designing these products. Lastly, and most im-
portantly, these automated programs, expressed preferably as 
open source code to all of the parties, should replace the writ-
ten indenture as legally binding specification and deal doc for 
the waterfall and its relevant inputs. This will reduce business 
and legal risk faced by dealmakers designing CDOs, who will 
no longer have to waste resources building indeterminate legal 
depictions of waterfalls. Instead, there will be one depiction of 
the waterfall, perception of which is deterministic and, while 
perhaps complicated in details, is not subject to interpretive 
discretion and multiple legal depictions. The combination of 
these three proposals is risk-reducing for all of the parties to a 
CDO or other structured finance arrangement. 
The technology is already being used, the models are al-
ready being built, and what needs to be done now is to remove 
the unnecessary, risk-creating legal depiction and substitute 
these automated tools. And in fact, as the swaps markets 
demonstrate, a change to programmatic representation is fea-
sible.159 
 
159. As an aside, this proposal has partial precedent in the massive 
swaps market, which often negotiates over programmatic descriptions of 
standardized swap deals before creating the deal documentation. Other fi-
nancial securities markets already negotiate over coded representations that 
more usefully describe the transaction’s execution than can the deal docu-
ments. Gordon F. Peery, Swap Documentation Must Conform to Three Final 
CFTC Rules by July 1, 2013, DERIVATIVES CLIENT ALERT (Borden Ladner Ger-
vais LLP, Toronto, Can.), June 2013, at 1, 1-7, available at 
http://www.martindale.com/members/Article_Atachment.aspx?od=1081999&i
d=1853564&filename=asr-1853568.Swap.pdf. Swaps are often communicat-
ed, for example, using a descriptive language called FpML. FpML Frequently 
Asked Questions, FPML, http://www.fpml.org/about/faq.html (last visited Jan. 
16, 2014). Information concerning the different legs of the swap (e.g., the dif-
ferent interest rates to be swapped), the timing of payments, etc., are speci-
fied in this language, and the models made in this language can also be used 
to monitor the transaction and execute payment(s). FpML Financial product 
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B.    Regulators Should and Can Facilitate and Require 
Dealmakers to Contract for Waterfalls in Code 
 
The proposals just discussed are desirable as a matter of 
legal–business strategy for the market participants to imple-
ment of their own volition. Using the transaction model of code 
as contract would save legal costs at the time of the transaction 
and reduce legal risk in the future. Market participants could 
adopt a standard or standards for coding as contract of their 
own volition, spiraling around a product like Intex or similar 
product just as they have in the market for predictive models. 
Given the dollar amounts in CDO or other structured finance 
transactions, the relative technological sophistication of the 
market participants on both sides of the deal, and the existence 
of commonly used tools in the market, the idea that market 
forces would lead participants to further develop their coded 
depictions and coalesce around a standard is quite feasible. 
 
Markup Language Recommendation 3 March 2011, FPML, 
http://www.fpml.org/spec/fpml-5-1-6-rec-1/html/confirmation (last visited Jan. 
16, 2014) (note especially parts 2.2 and 2.8). The relevant master agreement, 
confirmation, supplement, and other related contract documents are pro-
duced at different times, depending on the dealmakers. Sometimes, they are 
made before the deal is conducted and only the specific swap terms have to be 
set in the confirmation, sometimes simultaneously, often times after the elec-
tronic FpML-based deal has been made, and in some cases never at all. See 
Peery, supra at 1-2. 
  Problems have arisen because non-procedural parts of the deal—
primarily the dispute resolution process—has been left out when deals were 
made without proper deal documentation. Id. at 1-4. These dispute resolution 
terms and related ambiguities, like analogous elements of the general pro-
posal of this paper, are elements that largely are not rote and procedural and 
do in fact have a place in traditional legal drafting rather than programmatic 
representation. The failings of these electronic-only deals are largely a func-
tion of insufficient planning and drafting of the master agreements and rele-
vant supplement documents to account for basic good practice in transac-
tions. These problems are beyond the scope of this proposal to resolve. 
  The larger takeaway, however, is that this proposal is a credible one. 
Swaps are being made in unambiguous and programmatic forms that serve 
both to facilitate dealmaking and execution. The only remaining step is for 
these swap transactions to leave behind the paper trail for the core elements 
of the deal that are best expressed in terms of, for example, a document de-
scription language like FpML, in order to remove any of the potential ambi-
guities and coordination problems that might arise in the swaps context for 
the same reason they have arisen in the CDO context. 
48http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/8
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However, should government regulators have a role to play 
in facilitating or requiring the code as contract proposal? The 
discussion below will explain some of the current SEC rules 
that must change to facilitate coding the waterfall indenture 
and why the SEC should make those changes.160 Following that 
is the question of whether the SEC, CFTC, or some other regu-
latory entity should or can require that waterfalls be contract-
ed for as code.161 Finally, this discussion will conclude with 
recognition of the challenge that the bankruptcy regime, as a 
court-driven regulatory system, places in the way of this Arti-
cle’s proposal.162 
 
1. The SEC Needs to Adjust Its Disclosure Rules to Permit  
    Code as Contract 
 
The code as contract proposal facilitates the reduction of 
the number of legally relevant depictions. And, as mentioned 
above, this implies making the prospectus and other similar 
disclosures less or not legally relevant.163 If the prospectus re-
mains legally relevant, and if the SEC’s proposed Regulation 
AB II rules that would expand similar disclosure requirements 
to some classes of unregistered securities is adopted as drafted 
(or even in a form similar to what was drafted),164 there will be 
numerous legally relevant depictions to analyze for purposes of 
evaluating risk. 
First, under the current statutes and regulations, the SEC 
requires issuers of publicly offered securities, including bonds 
like those involved in CDOs, to register the security with the 
SEC.165 In order to register and sell the securities, the issuer 
 
160. See infra Part III.B.1. 
161. See infra Part III.B.2. 
162. See infra Part III.B.3. 
163. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
164. Re-Proposal of Shelf Eligibility Conditions for Asset-Backed Securi-
ties, Securities Act Release No. 33-9244, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64968, 
76 Fed. Reg. 47,948, 47970-71 (re-proposed Aug. 5, 2011) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 229, 230, 239 & 249). 
165. See Securities Act of 1933 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2012) (“The term 
‘security’ means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security-
based swap, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness.”); Securities Act of 
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must provide a prospectus that explains the relevant payouts 
and underlying assets.166 Misstatements in the prospectus can 
create legal liability.167 Regulation AB permits the waterfall 
structure to be disclosed and explained using diagrams and ta-
bles if helpful.168 Regulation AB only applies to publicly offered 
securities,169 however, and might not cover certain types of ac-
tively managed CDOs.170 
Privately placed CDOs are in a slightly less clear position 
with respect to the legal effect of disclosures. As it stands, pri-
vately placed CDOs need not be registered under the Securities 
Act, and thus need not disclose information like what is con-
tained in a prospectus, though typically they do disclose offer-
ing memoranda or circulars.171 CDOs are often sold in the pri-
mary market to accredited investors, and thus can take 
advantage of the statutory exemptions to registration.172 The 
SEC specifies safe harbors for exemptions to registration in 
Regulation D, and in particular Rule 144A, for private offerings 
of sales to qualified institutional buyers.173 The SEC has pro-
 
1933 § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2012) (enumerating exceptions to the registration 
requirement, including exemptions for private placements); Securities Act of 
1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77f (2012) (requiring registration of any non-exempted 
security); Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 77ddd (2012) (speci-
fying exceptions to trust indenture registration); Trust Indenture Act of 1939 
§ 306, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77eee-ggg (2012) (defining trust registration require-
ments). 
166. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2) (2012). 
167. See Securities Act of 1933 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 77l (2012). 
168. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.1103(a)(vi)-(ix) (2013); 17 C.F.R. § 229.1113 
(2013). 
169. See Regulation AB includes an elaboration of the general prospec-
tus requirement and does not bypass the Securities Act of 1933 § 4 exemp-
tions for privately issued securities. See Letter from Jeffrey W. Rubin, supra 
note 14, at 83-86. 
170. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.1101(c)(2)(ii) (2013). 
171. See Securities Act of 1933 § 4, 15 U.S.C. 77d(a)(2) (2012) (“The pro-
visions of section 77e of this title shall not apply to . . . transactions by an is-
suer not involving any public offering.”). 
172. See Bobby R. Bean, Supervisory Insights: Enhancing Transparency 
in the Structured Finance Market, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/sisum08/a
rticle01_ 
transparency.html (last updated Dec. 7, 2007). 
173. See 17 C.F.R. 230.144A(d) (2013). The rule explains what a quali-
50http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/8
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posed modifying Rule 144A to condition using the safe harbor 
for asset-backed securities disclosure requirements upon 
sellers, making disclosures similar to those required under 
proposed Regulation AB II.174 Relevant to coding the waterfall 
contract is that this would potentially include the Python pro-
posal, though that appears to still be in notice and comment.175 
In any case, the American Bar Association has argued persua-
sively, and the SEC agrees, that these safe harbor conditions 
cannot apply to offerings that fall expressly under sections 4(1) 
and 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.176 They would only cover 
those products that fall into the safe harbor provisions but not 










fied institutional buyer is: “Any of the following entities, acting for its own 
account or the accounts of other qualified institutional buyers, that in the ag-
gregate owns and invests on a discretionary basis at least $100 million in se-
curities of issuers that are not affiliated with the entity.” Id. § 
230.144A(a)(1)(i). The rule lists examples, including insurance companies, 
investment companies, state employee benefit plans, trust funds, investment 
advisers, dealers, and others. Id. 
174. Asset-Backed Securities, Securities Act Release No. 33-9117, Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-61858, 75 Fed. Reg. 23,328, 23,332-33 (proposed 
May. 3, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 229, 230, 232, 239, 240, 
243, & 249). 
175. Asset-Backed Securities, 75 Fed. Reg. at 23,395 (“The underlying 
transaction agreement for the securities must grant to purchasers, holders of 
the securities (or prospective purchasers designated by the holder) the right 
to obtain from the issuer of such securities the information, upon request, 
that would be required if the transaction were registered under the Securities 
Act and such ongoing information as would be required by Section 15(d) of 
the Exchange Act if the issuer were required to file reports under that sec-
tion.”). 
176. Letter from Jeffrey W. Rubin, supra note 14, at 85 & n.135 (citing 
Asset-Backed Securities, 75 Fed. Reg. at 23,394). 
177. Id. (citing Asset-Backed Securities, 75 Fed. Reg. at 23,394). 
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Figure 7. The Prospectus Problem for the Code  
as Contract Model 
 
In public offerings, and perhaps also in private place-
ments if the SEC moves on its Regulation AB II pro-
posal with respect to 144A for ABS offerings, the pro-
spectus comes back into play, competing to define the 
legal reality, with the legal reality able to trump the 
functional reality once again. 
 
To remove the requirement of multiple legally relevant de-
pictions of the waterfall, the SEC has options. First, for public-
ly traded securities, the SEC could permit the issuer to incor-
porate by reference into the prospectus as well as the contract 
the coded representation of the waterfall. This would resemble 
to current practice of those in the industry who try to incorpo-
rate the indenture or other agreement into the agreement.178 
What the SEC could allow, however, is that when the coded 
waterfall is incorporated by reference, no other description 
need be provided. And, furthermore, the SEC could recognize, if 
not dictate, that parties can agree that no matter what the pro-
 
178. Darmstadter, supra note 67, at 30 (“[M]any prospectuses still in-
corporate goodly chunks of the indenture without any explanation, concise or 
otherwise. The SEC has apparently acquiesced in the view that prospectus 
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spectus states, the coded representation prevails.179 This leaves 
the possibility of private claims under sections 11 and 12 of the 
Securities Act of 1933 based upon reliance upon the prospectus 
if descriptions are still provided,180 but by removing unsophisti-
cated investors from the market, most or all sales of these 
products would take place in private placements without a pro-
spectus requirement to create liability. 
Alternatively, the SEC could remove the prospectus re-
quirement entirely in the context of explaining waterfalls181 
and could discourage the use of written descriptions as risky 
representations bordering on deceptive under section 10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.182 This would remove po-
tential for private suits based on textual descriptions of the wa-
terfall because making those descriptions would be unaccepta-
ble. On the other hand, textual descriptions in the prospectus 
or offering memorandum could remain useful as a starting 
point for understanding a coded representation. The real issue 
is not the presence of such descriptions or even necessarily of 
legal depictions in the indenture, but rather their potential as a 
legal trump against the functional depiction. So while this pro-
posal would be the purest solution in terms of limiting the 
number of depictions, the first solution is likely the better one 
for providing useful information. 
An objection to these proposals for publicly offered securit-
ized products is that these products are already dangerous and 
hard to understand for sophisticated investors, many of whom 
relied upon credit ratings rather than their own evaluations of 
the products in the lead-up to the crisis.183 Unsophisticated in-
vestors, who could potentially purchase these products if they 
are publicly traded, face an even greater handicap at under-
 
179. Securities Act of 1933 § 28, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3 (2012) (“The Commis-
sion, by rule or regulation, may conditionally or unconditionally exempt any 
person, security, or transaction, or any class or classes of persons, securities, 
or transactions, from any provision or provisions of this subchapter or of any 
rule or regulation issued under this subchapter . . . .”). 
180. Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012); Securities Act of 
1933 § 12, 15 U.S.C. 77l (2012). 
181. Securities Act of 1933 § 28, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3. 
182. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). 
183. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
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standing the risks if the representations are made in coded 
form. This leads to a second component of the SEC’s considera-
tions: how to cope with unsophisticated investors’ purchases of 
products with waterfalls like those in CDOs. The possible solu-
tions range from banning the sale of these products to investors 
through FINRA suitability provisions184 to making a carve-out 
from this proposal that keeps the status quo prospectus-focused 
regime. Even under the current regime of suitability, a sale of 
such a high-risk product to an unsophisticated investor might 
run afoul of FINRA suitability rules binding broker–dealers.185 
But, assuming that they are suitable in the status quo, the 
SEC should push FINRA and other self-regulators to reduce or 
eliminate sales of CDO-type products with complex waterfalls 
to “unsophisticated” investors, perhaps arguing that they are 
inherently deceptive given the relevant buyer’s presumed ina-
bility to understand them. If, however, the SEC does not want 
to block sales of these structured financial products to unso-
phisticated investors, the SEC should likely carve out any non-
qualified institutional investor from the code as contract re-
gime. 
Sophisticated (“accredited”) investors can likely already 
implement the code as contract regime in private transac-
tions.186 Unless it includes the Python model, proposed Regula-
tion AB II’s expansion to the disclosure requirements of private 
placements will not interfere with their ability to choose the 
best legal depiction. FINRA’s Rule 5123 also only requires that 
documents used in the offering document be filed, but does not 
specify what those documents should include.187 It appears, 
 
184. See FINRA Manual Rule 2111 (effective Feb. 4, 2013), available at 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&record_i
d=14960. FINRA is a self-regulatory authority for broker–dealers. Get to 
Know Us, FINRA 2-3 (2012), 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/corporate/@corp/@about/documents/corporat
e/p118667.pdf. 
185. See FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 12-03, COMPLEX PRODUCTS: 
HEIGHTENED SUPERVISION OF COMPLEX PRODUCTS, 2 & n.9 (2012), available at 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notice
s/p125397.pdf (noting that FINRA has brought regulatory actions for trans-
actions in complex financial products unsuitable for the relevant investors). 
186. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
187. See FINRA Manual Rule 5123 (effective June 20, 2013), 
54http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/8
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though it remains an open question, that the SEC does not 
have any rules standing in the way of private placements pro-
gramming their waterfall indentures and incorporating that 
functional depiction as contract.188 
In summary, the SEC should remove unsophisticated, un-
accredited investors from the market for complex structured fi-




188. The role of regulation by Europe in the international market for se-
curities products like CDOs also requires consideration. The European Secu-
rities and Markets Authority (ESMA), a European Union (EU) entity, prom-
ulgates directives and mandates that are then implemented by member 
states. See Kate Ball-Dodd & Justine Usher, UK Implementation of Amend-
ments to the Prospectus Directive - Where Are We Now?, CAPITAL MKTS. LEGAL 




Prospectus_Directive.pdf. Like the US, public offerings of debt securities (like 
CDO bonds) are subject to a prospectus disclosure requirement with an ex-
ception for private placements with qualified investors. Directive 2010/73/EU, 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 Amend-
ing Directives 2003/71/EC on the Prospectus to Be Published When Securities 
Are Offered to the Public or Admitted to Trading, 2010 O.J. (L 327) 1, 6. The 
EU also provides an exception for the “wholesale market” in bonds as deter-
mined by the proxy that the minimum bond issue denomination size must be 
no less than €100,000 (anything smaller is the “retail market”), in which only 
a limited prospectus is required. Id. at 6. 
  Like in the U.S., the qualified investor category for private placements is 
likely the most relevant as it means that the EU Prospectus Directive would 
not apply, analogous to Rule 144A qualifying offerings in the US, meaning 
that in private placements the prospectus regime poses not challenges to the 
code as contract proposal. For public offerings of debt, including those in the 
wholesale market, ESMA should adopt modifications to the prospectus di-
rective analogous to those suggested in this Article. For a useful discussion of 
debt security prospectus-
es under EU regulations, see Guide to Listing Debt on European Stock Excha
nges, PWC (2012) 3-7, https://www.pwc.com/en_UA/ua/services/capital-
markets/assets/guide-to-listing-of-debt-ua-en.pdf. 
Also, for an extensive discussion of prospectus liability in EU member states, 
which could, like private claims in the US, create problems for a regulatory 
shift in prospectus requirements, see ESMA, COMPARISON OF LIABILITY 
REGIMES IN MEMBER STATES IN RELATION TO THE PROSPECTUS DIRECTIVE 6-26 
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legally binding characteristic of the prospectus as much as pos-
sible in order to facilitate the use of the code as contract trans-
action model for these products. The SEC does not, however, 
need to do anything to facilitate the use of this model in the 
private offering setting as its current additions to the private 
offering requirements do not as of yet create additional legally 
binding depictions of the waterfall. 
 
2.  The SEC Should Encourage or Require the Use of the  
     Code as Contract Model 
 
While individual market participants might want to adopt 
the code as contract model for drafting indenture waterfalls, 
they might face a problem that could be characterized as an 
absence of an economy of networks.189 As the first telephone in-
vented lacks value until there is a second telephone to answer 
the call,190 participants in the CDO and structured finance 
market might not adopt this Article’s code as contract proposal 
unless several investors agree to play ball at once. Many insti-
tutional investors that purchase CDOs, however, might not 
want to make the leap to using the code as contract model until 
several issuers adopt it in order to achieve economy of scale. 
And neither side will want to make the initial leap to spend 
adoption costs unless there is a standard or standards among 
participants. This is a classic case for government regulatory 
intervention where, unless private self-regulating entities or 
large collectives of market participants agree among them-
selves to adopt, adoption might not occur. Government or self-
regulatory organization (FINRA) promotion or mandate could 
remove this network deficiency problem. 
The SEC has started the discussion about the standardiza-
tion of disclosure of a programmatic representation in its pro-
posed Regulation AB II, asking for more comments on how to 
 
189. DAVID EASLEY & JON KLEINBERG, NETWORKS, CROWDS, AND MARKETS 
509 (2010), available at http://www.cs.cornell.edu/home/kleinber/networks-
book/networks-book-ch17.pdf. 




2014] TOO COMPLEX TO PERCEIVE? 405 
 
best implement its disclosure proposal.191 This knowledge-
gathering exercise means that the industry and regulators are 
engaged in a discussion about the specific form a coding stand-
ard to represent waterfalls and inputs could take. The discus-
sion the SEC has started could by itself be sufficient to facili-
tate the market players coalescing around a particular 
standard without action by the SEC. Unfortunately, there has 
not been a similar discussion about this Article’s proposed code 
as contract model of waterfall transactions, but reaching some 
consensus about what a coded disclosure could look like would 
overcome one of the largest business hurdles facing a code as 
contract transaction regime. 
Beyond the benefit to the dealmakers of mandating a code 
as contract proposal, such a rule offers a positive externality to 
the public. If all complex structured finance waterfalls are de-
picted as code that has been thoroughly vetted by structurers, 
investors, and trustees, then the SEC will have access to accu-
rate cash flow distribution models with which to analyze its 
newly gathered data. The SEC is currently considering asset-
level data disclosures as part of an amendment to Regulation 
AB and related proposals about safe harbor criteria.192 This in-
formation will provide the agency a greater ability to stress test 
both individual products and markets in these products in a 
manner comparable to that used by investors and credit rating 
organizations themselves. It will also permit a broader analysis 
of the market in these products in order to understand the 
risks they actually entail, rather they what they might entail if 
predictive models are used. 
The SEC should propose and invite comments on a rule to 
require that waterfalls be represented by code as contract ra-
ther than using disclosures of prospectuses and contracts. It 
has a few legal approaches it can take. One approach would be 
 
191. Re-Proposal of Shelf Eligibility Conditions for Asset-Backed Securi-
ties, Securities Act Release No. 33-9244, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64968, 
76 Fed. Reg. 47,948, 47971 (re-proposed Aug. 5, 2011) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 229, 230, 239 & 249). 
192. Asset-Backed Securities, Securities Act Release No. 33-9117, Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-61858, 75 Fed. Reg. 23,328, 23,328 (proposed May. 
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to require as a disclosure a programmatic representation that 
has a legally effective characteristic, and by requiring this dis-
closure create the new legal reality. This would require the dis-
closure of a legally determinative coded representation of the 
waterfall. Two parts to such a requirement could cause protest. 
First, there is the disclosure of something that does not yet ex-
ist: the disclosure of a coded representation of the waterfall. 
Second, this disclosure must be legally binding on the parties. 
Looking at the first, the SEC has already begun to think 
about this in its Python proposals.193 Legal protests from the 
ABA to that proposal demonstrate some of the difficulties of 
finding statutory authority for even that relatively modest pro-
posal, let alone the more dramatic change proposed in this Ar-
ticle.194 As the ABA argued in a comment to the SEC’s Python 
proposal, the code disclosure is not a “statement” under the Se-
curities Act of 1933, and therefore no liability can be assigned 
for misstatement through incorrect coded depictions.195 The 
ABA’s most interesting argument is that since a computer pro-
gram cannot be a misstatement, an idea that sits at the heart 
of my proposal, it cannot constitute a statement.196 This is not 
persuasive because misstatement is still possible if the disclo-
sure is a computer programs. The wrong code, for example, 
could be disclosed and that would constitute a misstatement in 
the form of code. Furthermore, if code is not a disclosure, then 
neither is disclosure of tables of data, which also carry with 
them no facial ambiguity and can only be false in representing 
miscalculations of the use of the wrong data. Beyond these se-
mantic games, section 7 of the Securities Act of 1933, amended 
by the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act, orders the SEC to adopt regulations requiring data 
disclosure “regarding the assets backing that security,” and to 
“set standards for the format of the data provided by issu-
ers.”197 This also seems to give the SEC a great deal of discre-
 
193. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. 
194. See Letter from Jeffrey W. Rubin, supra note 14, at 58-59. 
195. See id. 
196. Id. 
197. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. §942 (2010); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77g(c) (2012). 
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tion to determine how to format the data to make it useful as a 
disclosure, and the SEC could readily hang a code as contract 
requirement on this language even if it could not use the tradi-
tional sources of authority in the Securities Act. 
A more difficult question is whether the SEC can require 
that disclosure to have certain characteristics such as being le-
gally binding using disclosure provisions. There does not ap-
pear to be a precedent of the SEC dictating the structure of a 
financial product transaction directly, and almost certainly 
none of the agency dictating the structure of a private place-
ment transaction. The most likely statutory hook would have to 
be in the provisions for deceptive practices in securities. And in 
particular the famous section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934: 
 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or 
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of 
any facility of any national securities exchange— 
 
. . . . 
 
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security registered on 
a national securities exchange or any security 
not so registered, or any securities-based 
swap agreement, any manipulative or decep-
tive device or contrivance in contravention of 
such rules and regulations as the Commis-
sion may prescribe as necessary or appropri-
ate in the public interest or for the protection 
of investors.198 
 
Rule 10b-5 further provides: 
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It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or 
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of 
any facility of any national securities exchange, 
 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice 
to defraud, 
 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a mate-
rial fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or 
 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of 
business which operates or would operate as 
a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any securi-
ty.199 
 
While this pair does require scienter and faces other signif-
icant impediments as an enforcement mechanism,200 its wide 
reach into private and public offerings as well as into just 
about any form of securitized products makes it an ideal place 
to grab hold of for purposes of regulating the nature of a prod-
uct.201 The SEC then need “only” evaluate how past experiences 
with contractual and prospectus explanations of waterfalls 
have impeded the effective comprehension by investors in 
CDOs. Assuming the SEC concurs, can confirm it with addi-
tional fact-finding through research and notice and comment, 
the SEC could then promulgate a rule declaring per se decep-
tive the use of written contractual and prospectus waterfall ar-
rangements in the contexts where they pose the greatest risk. 
The SEC could even argue directly from section 10(b) rather 
than operating through Rule 10b-5 in order to permit itself 
 
199. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2013). 
200. In re Parmalat Secs. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 472, 491-93 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005) (explaining the elements of implied actions under Rule 10b-5). 
201. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78(j). 
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greater leeway with respect to court-created precedent sur-
rounding that rule, among other issues. 
The SEC can require the use of the code as contract model, 
though it might face challenges in the D.C. Circuit on the basis 
of whether it is arbitrary and capricious.202 However, consider-
ing the potentially significant benefit in removing legal doubt 
and the fact that it might alleviate a market failure (a weak 
network) that could stand in the way of this proposal’s imple-
mentation, it appears that the benefit side of such a regulation 
would be substantial. Furthermore, the cost side is likely rela-
tively small in the long run, given the substantial current use 
of predictive models by market participants. As for whether 
such a regulation fits the intent of Congress, it appears clear 
from section 10(b) that Congress intended to give the SEC flex-
ibility to decide what is deceptive for consumers.203 Further-
more, section 7 indicates that Congress wanted the SEC gener-
ally involved in regulating structured financial products.204 
The CFTC’s role in regulating products like CDOs remains 
unclear. In interpretive letters, the CFTC first announced that 
very limited forms of asset-backed securities and special pur-
pose vehicles that use swaps could avoid regulation by the 
CFTC.205 A second interpretive letter established that any 
product regulated under SEC Regulation AB or privately is-
sued but otherwise like a product regulated under Regulation 
AB would not be considered a commodity pool, a characteriza-
tion that would pull CDOs into the CFTC’s bailiwick.206 Other 
 
202. For an extensive discussion of the D.C. Circuit’s repeated decisions 
overturning SEC rulemaking, see James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, 
The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting the D.C. Circuit’s Usurpation of 
SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1811 (2012). 
203. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78(j). 
204. 15 U.S.C. § 77g(c). 
205. Letter from Gary Barnett, Dir., Div. of Swap Dealer & Intermediary 
Oversight, to Am. Securitizations Forum & SIFMA, CFTC Letter No. 12-14, 
at 4-6 (Oct. 11, 2012) (on file with CFTC), available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral/documents/letter/12-
14.pdf . 
206. Letter from Letter from Gary Barnett, Dir., Div. of Swap Dealer & 
Intermediary Oversight, CFTC Letter No. 12-45, at 1-4 (Dec. 7, 2012) (on file 
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products where there is active trading or where the swaps play 
a more significant role than credit enhancement might be 
commodity pools and thus subject to CFTC regulation, though 
the CFTC has expressed its willingness to operate on a case-by-
case basis for the moment through no-action letters.207 This is a 
very unstable area of law, and until the CFTC and SEC sort 
out their jurisdictional turfs, what role the CFTC could play in 





207. Id. at 4-6. 
208. The risk of regulatory arbitrage rears its head in the case of almost 
any regulation that has the potential to require upfront investment. See, e.g., 
Christian A. Johnson, Regulatory Arbitrage, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and 
Dodd-Frank: The Implications of US Global OTC Derivative Regulation, 
Univ. of Utah Coll. of Law Research Paper No. 16 (Oct. 30, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2169401. In this case, the 
risk is that the market in these securities products could run to European 
markets, closing down US trade in these financial products. 
  There are two answers to this concern. First, as this Article has gone to 
lengths to demonstrate, the code as contract regime is better for participants 
in the market because it reduces risk and complexity in the deal-making pro-
cess. A mandate to adopt this regime could be seen as welcome by market-
participants if the details are handled appropriately. If executed well, the 
market in these complex financial products very well might prefer the deal-
making structure under the code as contract model and move more of their 
business in these products to the US. 
  Second, this Article contends that ESMA should itself adopt a code as 
contract mandate for these goods. It looks like the EU will soon grant ESMA 
significant power to ban financial products it deems dangerous in emergen-
cies, and will also be able to coordinate with member states’ regulatory bodies 
to arrange bans on specific products. Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on Markets in Financial Instruments Repeal-
ing Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, at 
184, COM (2011) 656 final (Oct. 20, 2011). Between this forthcoming capacity 
to ban certain products as well as its role in establishing the technical stand-
ards for prospectuses through the Prospectus Directive, ESMA should have 
the authority to implement technical disclosure standards. It would be going 
too far afield, however, for this Article to consider the administrative authori-
ty of ESMA, which is most lucidly explained by ESMA itself in Frequently 
Asked Questions, A Guide to Understanding ESMA, ESMA 4-5 (Jan. 3, 2011) 
http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/2011_009.pdf, and the future of 
which appears to be in dispute at the moment. See Elan Mendel, Fight over 
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3. The Problem of the Bankruptcy Regime 
 
While regulatory challenges discussed above are difficult, 
they can likely be overcome through relatively minimal agency 
and self-regulatory organization action. The Bankruptcy Code, 
however, presents a more substantial challenge to the code as 
contract proposal. The waterfall cash distribution is effectively 
designed to specify priorities in the event of a cash shortfall or 
other event of default.209 Some events of default resemble in-
solvency by the CDO.210 In those cases, the bondholders can 
turn to pushing the trustee to seek bankruptcy or seek a bank-
ruptcy court to force involuntary bankruptcy on the CDO.211 
Once in bankruptcy, the problems begin to mount for a water-
fall, whether it is written in words or programmed in contract. 
First, if the waterfall flips its order in the case of insolvency, 
that might constitute an illegal ipso facto clause, which is a 
clause in a contract (unsuccessfully) designed to end a contract 
(or dramatically change a contract) upon bankruptcy of a par-
ty.212 Second, even apart from an ipso facto clause attack, credi-
 
209. See In re Zais Inv. Grade Ltd. VII, 455 B.R. 839, 842-43 (Bankr. 
D.N.J. 2011) (describing the structure of a CDO2 waterfall including its liqui-
dation specification in the case of a default not of payment but of indenture 
covenants). 
210. See, e.g., id. (describing a covenant default that provides for trustee-
managed liquidation in which assets are changed to passive management and 
the only activity is a paying down of the bonds to the senior tranche holders). 
211. See, e.g., id. (explaining that senior tranche holders sought an in-
voluntary petition for bankruptcy for the CDO). 
212. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e) (2012); 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(B) (2012). The text 
provides as follows: 
 
Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, an 
interest of the debtor in property becomes property of the 
estate under subsection (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(5) of this section 
notwithstanding any provision in an agreement, transfer in-
strument, or applicable nonbankruptcy law 
 
. . . . 
 
(B) that is conditioned on the insolvency or financial 
condition of the debtor, on the commencement of a case 
under this title, or on the appointment of or taking pos-
session by a trustee in a case under this title or a custo-
63
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tors might seek involuntary liquidation that would restructure 
the waterfall without resistance from the trustee.213 
The fact that these “bankruptcy remote”214 CDO SPV enti-
ties can be dragged into bankruptcy court and liquidated much 
like any other business entity creates a potential alternate le-
gal reality on the bankruptcy courts’ and senior creditors’ tabu-
la rasa.215 The senior creditors and the bankruptcy court can 
significantly restructure the debt within the limits of the 
Bankruptcy Code and without regard to the indenture. What 
structure this new waterfall and asset structure will have, 
none of the creditors who purchased the CDO bond could have 
predicted from any functional depiction or legal depiction pro-
vided at the time of sale. Furthermore, a New Jersey bank-
 
dian before such commencement, and that effects or 
gives an option to effect a forfeiture, modification, or 
termination of the debtor’s interest in property. 
 
11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(B). For an example of a court characterizing a shift in 
waterfall as potentially an illegal ipso facto clause, see In re Lehman Bros. 
Holdings, Inc., 452 B.R. 31, 37-38 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (denying a motion 
to dismiss a claim based on an ipso facto clause argument). Ballyrock was a 
CDO vehicle and a Lehman subsidiary had contracted for a swap arrange-
ment with Ballyrock. Id. at 33-37. Ballyrock’s trust indenture placed repay-
ment of this swap in third priority in the waterfall except in the event that 
Lehman entered bankruptcy, in which case Lehman was placed very low in 
the waterfall. Id. at 34-36. Under the swap terms, Lehman was owed money 
and claimed that money under its swap contract from Ballyrock. Id. at 34-36. 
Ballyrock pointed to the clause placing Lehman near the bottom of the water-
fall, while Lehman argued that it was an invalid ipso facto clause because it 
was triggered by bankruptcy. Id. at 36-37. The court agreed with Lehman, 
and removed the contingency from the waterfall, and permitting the suit to 
go forward. Id. at 37. For a discussion of this case generally, see Court Holds 
that a Bankruptcy Termination Provision that Subordinates an In-The-Money 
Debtor’s Right to a Distribution May Be an Unenforceable Ipso Facto Provi-
sion, BANKRUPTCY ADVISORY (Alston & Bird LLP, Atlanta, Ga.), June 16, 




213. See, e.g., Zais, 455 B.R. at 843-44 (describing the trustee’s inaction). 
214. Lawrence V. Gelbert et al., Bankruptcy Court Approves Plan to 
Liquidate CDO, SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL LLP (Jan. 19, 2012), 
http://www.srz.com/Bankruptcy_Court_Approves_Plan_to_Liquidate_CDO/. 
215. See, e.g., Zais, 455 B.R. at 844-45. (explaining that creditors pro-
posed the new liquidation payment plan). 
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ruptcy court in a case called Zais held that junior creditors are 
not entitled to defend themselves by challenging the right of 
the senior creditors to propose a new payout structure.216 The 
relevant parties are renegotiating the deal and redesigning the 
waterfalls subject to a vote of the bondholders, as many inden-
tures permit.217 Instead, bankruptcy is a change of the water-
fall affected through the all-but fiat of the senior tranche hold-
ers. Add to this the problem of cross-jurisdictional contradiction 
in bankruptcy court interpretations of waterfalls, as in the re-
cent Dante case where British and American courts reached 
opposite conclusions about a CDO waterfall prioritization, and 
problem posed by the bankruptcy regime is worsened fur-
ther.218 Bankruptcy proceedings, by creating an alternative le-
gal reality based on late-created depictions in the forms of mo-
tions and bankruptcy proposals, create a low probability but 
potentially high cost risk that a coded waterfall will not always 
be the legal reality. 
Given the real risk of bankruptcy’s legal reality trumping 
the coded waterfall’s legal and function reality, two questions 
arise: should dealmakers do something about this problem, 
and, if so, can they? Putting aside the question of whether ipso 
facto clauses should be permitted in general or not, which has 
been discussed at length by others,219 the answer is probably 
yes, dealmakers should probably seek to find a way to make 
these deals more bankruptcy proof. CDO deals are inherently 
 
216. Id. at 846-47. 
217. See, e.g., id. at 843 (“Anchorage attempted, without success, to con-
vince ZING VII to rectify the passive holding of its assets. Under the trust 
indenture, the only way to achieve an orderly liquidation of the assets is to 
obtain the consent of 66.67% of all noteholders, which Anchorage deems high-
ly unlikely, if not impossible.”). 
218. Concerning the prioritization of payments from a waterfall in the 
event of bankruptcy, again on grounds that the relevant clause changing pri-
oritization was an ipso facto clause, a U.S. bankruptcy court held that a 
change in prioritization of a swap was invalid. See In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc., 422 B.R. 407, 415-20 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). English courts 
addressing the same contractual language found there to be no problem with 
the switch. Id. at 423. 
219. See, e.g., Yeon-Koo Che & Alan Schwartz, Section 365, Mandatory 
Bankruptcy Rules and Inefficient Continuance, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 441 
(1999) (criticizing the ipso facto clause ban as inefficiently leading bankrupt 
creditors to continue bad, lossy contracts). 
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about allocating risk to meet the risk preferences of investors—
something that becomes even clearer in the case of bespoke 
CDOs.220 The Bankruptcy Code serves a completely different 
purpose. The same arguments presented earlier in this paper 
that militate against permitting multiple legal realities in gen-
eral apply equally to bankruptcy for that reason.221 One of the 
main purposes of the Bankruptcy Code in the commercial con-
text is to allocate collections of debt in the event of a race for 
assets,222 does not apply in the context of CDOs. If the inden-
ture is followed, and especially if the indenture is coded as pro-
posed in this Article, then the creditors should know and un-
derstand how the liquidation process will take place. There is 
no race to be first at the debtors doors because the trustee will 
provide no relief unless it is what the indenture specifies. 
These creditors are not normal businesses, they are sophisti-
cated investment vehicles typically—often SPVs in their own 
right with no purpose but to hold assets and designed based 
upon the operation of their own waterfall—and their sole rai-
son d’être223 is to assume and allocate risk. Therefore, it does 
not seem appropriate that they should be freed from the bar-
gain they made when, unlike a home contractor facing non-
payment, these deals and entities have no other economic pur-
pose, and cannot serve that purpose if bankruptcy proceedings 
trump the structure of their reality. 
The solution, fortunately, might not, and should not, re-
quire a change of the bankruptcy laws. Instead, the change 
might be accomplished by requiring trustees, as representa-
tives of the debtor CDO, to challenge the qualifications of sen-
ior tranche holders to seek involuntary bankruptcy proceed-
ings. As for how they can fight it, one strategy would be to turn 
to a legal question that remains open after the New Jersey 
 
220. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing bespoke 
CDOs). 
221. See supra Part II.B. 
222. Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Implied Good 
Faith Filing Requirement: Sentinel of an Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 85 NW. 
U. L. REV. 919, 948-62 (1991). 
223. “[R]eason or justification for existence.” Raison d’être, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/raison%20d'%C3%AAtre (last visited Jan. 16, 2014). 
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case, Zais, which is whether senior tranche holders should be 
able to escape the trust indenture structure through bankrupt-
cy.224 Junior creditors in Zais argued that the senior tranche 
holders were not qualified to seek involuntary proceedings 
against the CDO under section 303(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy 
Code225 because their debt was “non-recourse.”226 That is to say, 
the senior creditors had claim only to secured assets and noth-
ing more than the value of those assets,227 and thus did not 
meet § 303(b)(1)’s delimited minimum value required in order 
to seek an involuntary action.228 The Zais court did not reach 
this question, and it seems a plausible argument for trustees to 
use. This is, of course, only one legal theory among many oth-
ers that might be available if only the trustee is required by the 
indenture to put up a fight. 
Even if the trustee cannot win the day on the liquidation 
waterfall clause by resisting the qualifications of the attacking 
creditors, the trustee might also lean on § 510 of the Bankrupt-
cy Code, which provides that “[a] subordination agreement is 
enforceable in a case under this title to the same extent that 
such agreement is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy 
law,”229 in order to preserve the waterfall in general. The case 
law has several warts, including the absence of a useful defini-
tion of subordination, a dependency on bankruptcy court inter-
pretation of state contract law, and so forth, but the consensus 
appears to be that subordination language remains enforceable 
so long as other bankruptcy rights are not impeded.230 This is 
 
224. See Zais, 455 B.R. at 846 (declining to decide the qualifications of 
senior creditors to seek involuntary bankruptcy). 
225. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1) (2013). 
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ble explanation of non-recourse loans in the mortgage context, see Carr 
McClellan, Does Non-Recourse Liability Still Exist?, CARR MCCLELLAN LAW 
BLOG (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.carrmcclellan.com/does-non-recourse-
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228. Zais, 455 B.R. at 846. 
229. 11 U.S.C. § 510(a) (2012). 
230. For a thorough discussion of the subordination clause, including the 
“warts” discussed in the text accompanying this note, see Mark N. Berman & 
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not a perfect outcome, it leaves a small possibility of an addi-
tional legal reality in which the court chooses to switch to liq-




Figure 8. The Bankruptcy Problem for the Code 
as Contract Model 
 
All bets are off in bankruptcy unless the trustee re-
sists intervention and bankruptcy courts recognize 
that the purposes of bankruptcy are not served in the 
context of structured finance SPV waterfalls by re-




This Article has expanded upon Professor Hu’s explanation 
of the challenge of multiple depictions of complex securities wa-
terfalls by adding to the idea of depiction its counterpart of per-
ception. Multiple legally relevant depictions make the act of 
perceiving the future legal reality extremely difficult, and fol-
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lowing the SEC’s, England’s, and Professor Hu’s path, which 
adds yet more legally relevant depictions into the mix, will only 
add to that confusion. The more legally relevant depictions 
there are, the greater the legal risk faced by structurers, trus-
tees, and investors. 
Instead, for complex but highly procedural arrangements 
like CDO, MLP, and private equity fund waterfalls, a better 
transaction structure would be to negotiate around the actual 
cash flow distribution program, just like those negotiating a 
construction contract focus on the blueprint. By devoting busi-
ness energy to perfecting the actual, functional depiction of the 
cash flow and its inputs, this improves the likelihood of reach-
ing something like the desired cash distribution reality. Fur-
thermore, it removes the slippages between depictions and al-
lows lawyers to focus on what lawyers are good at: structuring 
language about warranties about other aspects of the deal. 
Adopting the code as contract strategy is simply good legal–
business strategy. 
As a corollary, the SEC should adjust its prospectus re-
quirements in order to allow deals with sophisticated investors 
to avoid the prospectus liability. Furthermore, unsophisticated 
investors should not be involved in the market. The SEC 
should consider mandating the code as contract dealmaking re-
gime in order to remove the network effects challenges facing 
potential innovators seeking to adopt the regime. Not only 
would such a regulatory move benefit the parties, but it would 
also facilitate regulatory stress testing of these highly risky 
products. There are several statutory and regulatory hooks on-
to which the SEC could hang such a policy change despite how 
different this policy would be from traditional SEC disclosure-
based regulation. And requiring trustees to defend the inden-
ture might in and of itself be an effective strategy to prevent 
bankruptcy from creating alternative legal realities, and how 
even if a trustee is not successful, bankruptcy courts tend to re-
spect subordination clauses, despite examples to the contrary. 
Additional work follows any recommendation. First, in this 
case, there is the question of detail. How the code as contract 
model is adopted and whether it is a good regime depends 
largely upon technical and legal implementation. Second, there 
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is the question of breadth. This proposal could be applicable to 
numerous analogous structures in securities and beyond to pri-
vate equity and master limited partnership arrangements, 
each of which come with their own legal hurdles. Or, even with-
in the ABS context, a collateralization model for verifying the 
quality of assets could be incorporated as part of the deal ra-
ther than attempting to specify the necessary collateralization 
in words. Outside of securities, anywhere in which complicated 
but procedural structures exist, deals are somewhat commodi-
tized and repeated, and the parties to deals are sufficiently so-
phisticated, this code as contract model could be useful. Im-
plementing the code as contract model in the waterfalls context 
as well as others yet to be considered offers the possibility to 
fundamentally alter the framework for dealmaking, overcom-
ing problems of analyzing risk in a market of products too com-
plex to perceive. 
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